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The doctrine of duress is common to other bodies of law, but the 
application of the duress doctrine is both unclear and highly unstable in 
immigration law. Outside of immigration law, a person who commits a 
criminal act out of well-placed fear of terrible consequences is different 
than a person who willingly commits a crime, but American immigration 
law does not recognize this difference. The lack of clarity leads to certain 
absurd results and demands reimagining, redefinition, and an unequivocal 
statement of the significance of duress in ascertaining culpability. While 
there are inevitably some difficult lines to be drawn in any definition or 
application of the doctrine, as a general matter, it is well established 
everywhere but in immigration law that varying levels of culpability exist 
and that those variations matter.1 
Consider the story of a teenaged girl, Ana,2 who moves in with her 
boyfriend after being cast out by her parents. The boyfriend turns 
physically and sexually abusive, and when Ana tries to run away, he finds 
her and brings her back, deepening his control over her. He then forces her 
to carry drugs for him by letting her know he will rape her if she refuses. 
This is an ugly story, but one that lawyers who work with immigrants 
know well, in infinite variations of the basic narrative. It is also a story 
that, even in this general formulation, meets globally accepted elements of 
the duress defense:3 an imminent, credible threat of serious consequences, 
where the person has no reasonable opportunity to escape. 
 
 1. See discussion of this disparity infra Part I. 
 2. This is a lightly fictionalized story of one of my pro bono clients whom I have been 
representing for more than five years because her case has been made needlessly complex and 
contentious due to the legal issues identified in this Article. Indeed, the injustices of her case form the 
core inspiration for this Article. 
 3. See discussion on various contexts infra Part I. 
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As this Article proceeds, we will see how Ana’s story reveals how 
disjointed the application of duress is, not just within U.S. immigration 
law but between U.S. immigration law and the criminal and international 
laws whose landscapes are so much more richly theorized. The Article 
will, in Part I, define the duress doctrine and its philosophical and policy 
underpinnings in United States criminal law and in international criminal 
and refugee law. While there are variations within these bodies of law, 
they share a degree of commonality that is remarkable considering the 
differences in their domains. Part II.A will turn to the role and position  
of duress doctrine in immigration law, specifically in these contexts: 
human trafficking, crimmigration,4 grounds of inadmissibility and 
deportability, and denaturalization proceedings. This range of approaches 
provides the background and contrast for the discussion of duress in 
asylum law in Part II.B. 
But Ana’s story helps us see the need for these comparisons. Let us 
use this basic story as a prism for viewing the morass of conflicting 
treatments of duress in immigration law. If the story happened within the 
United States, two things might happen. First, if arrested for carrying 
drugs, Ana would be able to avail herself of the duress defense in her 
criminal proceeding in both the prosecution phase and the sentencing 
phase. In the prosecution phase, proof of duress could remove the mens 
rea requirement for Ana, depending upon the particular statute used to 
charge her.5 If she is convicted, duress would be a factor mitigating any 
possible sentence. In either case, the existence of duress either makes a 
conviction less likely at all or reduces its impacts—which will be very 
important to whether the government would seek to remove Ana. 
But perhaps there is no criminal prosecution because the prosecutor 
realizes Ana is more a victim than a perpetrator or because the conduct of 
carrying drugs never comes to light. Ana could also use these basic facts 
to seek a visa as a victim of a severe form of human trafficking; that visa 
would place her on a path to a green card and citizenship.6 The same facts 
of coercion and duress that reduce her culpability in the criminal legal 
system form the basis of meeting that trafficking victim definition7 
 
 4. “Crimmigration” is a term coined by Professor Juliet Stumpf to encompass the myriad ways 
that the criminal legal system and immigration laws intersect. Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration 
Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 377 (2006); see, e.g., Tanvi 
Misra, The Rise of ‘Crimmigration,’ BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Sept. 16, 2016), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-16/c-sar-garc-a-hern-ndez-on-the-rise-of-
crimmigration [https://perma.cc/9A8M-FKML]. The term has since become widely used in the field 
of immigration law. 
 5. See infra notes 61–63 and accompanying text. 
 6. See INA § 101(a)(15)(T); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T). 
 7. See Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, 22 U.S.C. § 7102(11). The 
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act defines severe forms of trafficking as  
310 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 44:307 
because she has been obtained and used, coercively, for the purpose of 
involuntary servitude (the drug-carrying but potentially also to provide 
sex). The fact that her labor (carrying drugs) is illegal is beside the  
point—indeed, another segment of trafficking law is devoted entirely to 
coerced sex work, and sex work is criminalized in almost all American 
states.8 The trafficking law recognizes her as a victim and is in sync with 
how the criminal legal system understands her reduced, or nonexistent, 
complicity in the conduct. 
However, let us imagine Ana’s story happened in Colombia, and her 
abuser was a member of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC). To simplify the case for the purposes of this Article,9 let us 
assume Ana is Afro-Colombian, and race is one demonstrated reason for 
his abuse of her. First, Ana applies for a visa. Let us assume time has 
passed, she escaped her abuser and founded a business, and she now wants 
to travel to California to meet with a prospective client. She applies for a 
business visitor visa and qualifies for it except she is inadmissible10 
because she has provided “material support” to terrorists (the FARC), by 
carrying the drugs for her abuser.11 The terrorism grounds of 
inadmissibility are notably broad, and even the most minimal actions count 
as impermissible material support.12 There is no duress exception to the 
material support bar, so Ana will not be issued the visa. Although she may 
 
(A) sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, 
or in which the person induced to perform such act has not attained 18 years of age; or (B) 
the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or 
services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to 
involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery.  
Id. 
 8. US Federal and State Prostitution Laws and Related Punishments, BRITANNICA PROCON.ORG 
(May 4, 2018), https://prostitution.procon.org/us-federal-and-state-prostitution-laws-and-related-
punishments [https://perma.cc/D7UU-VMTW]. 
 9. See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018). Asylum cases based upon gender and 
gender-based violence are in a state of heightened contest and uncertainty in the wake of the Attorney 
General’s controversial decision. 
 10. See INA § 101(a)(15); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (for “nonimmigrant” visitors definition); 
INA § 203; 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (for lawful permanent residents definition). Inadmissibility is a significant 
concept in immigration law. Someone must both fit within a visa category and be admissible.  
In this hypothetical, Ana qualifies for a nonimmigrant visa under INA § 101(a)(15)(B); 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(B). But the immigration law prevents people from coming to the country for 
a host of reasons set, forth in INA § 212; 8 U.S.C. § 1182, from criminal offense to likelihood of 
becoming a public charge to involvement in terrorist activity—the last of which is at issue in this 
hypothetical. 
 11. See INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B). 
 12. See INA § 212(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv); see also Matter of A-C-M-, 27 
I. & N. Dec. 303 (B.I.A. 2018) (holding that even de minimis support falls within this bar to 
admissibility). 
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apply for a waiver of that ground of inadmissibility, that waiver is entirely 
discretionary and is granted rarely.13 
Or perhaps Ana escaped from her abuse and made her way to the 
United States, where she applies for asylum, and her facts meet the 
requirements for asylum.14 She has a well-founded fear of persecution (in 
her case rape, beatings, and perhaps death) at the hands of her abuser on 
account of her race, and her abuser is someone the Colombian government 
cannot control. She qualifies for asylum—except that, in carrying the 
drugs for him, she has perhaps committed a serious nonpolitical crime, 
which is a bar to protection under our asylum law. The government’s 
position is that there is no duress exception to this bar, and if that position 
holds, the same duress that would have qualified Ana for immigration 
benefits in the previous paragraph makes her ineligible for immigration 
protection now.15 
In the criminal system, duress, at least, mitigates Ana’s culpability. 
It could provide the basis for a special human trafficking visa or support a 
waiver of the terrorism bar to her admission to the United States. But the 
government would ignore duress in the asylum context, putting asylum out 
of reach. How could the same set of facts yield such absurdly different 
results? As the Immigration and Nationality Act has absorbed laws and 
priorities from different directions over the years,16 it has done so without 
any conceptual harmony, and the diversity of treatments of duress reflect 
that disjointedness. These absurdly different results undermine confidence 
in the law. It is also out of step with other domestic and international 
understandings of the role duress plays in criminal culpability. 
U.S. criminal law has long recognized the principle of duress in both 
common law and criminal statutes.17 International criminal law and 
international refugee law both largely mirror these domestic principles. 
While certainly not reaching the level of a jus cogens norm,18 the 
synchrony among the bodies of law is striking, and the distinctions are 
relatively small. These diverse bodies of law share core elements: that the 
 
 13. See infra Part II.A, notes 144–146 and accompanying text. 
 14. See INA § 101(a)(42); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) for the definition of a refugee for asylum 
purposes. 
 15. See infra Part II.B for discussion on the Department of Homeland Security’s litigation 
position has been to oppose the relevance of duress in understanding bars to asylum; while the Board 
of Immigration Appeals within Department of Justice did establish the duress doctrine, the Attorney 
General immediately certified the case to himself, which he does when he disagrees with Board 
reasoning. 
 16. See infra Part III.A. 
 17. See infra Part II.A. 
 18. “Jus cogens” from the Latin for compelling law. Jus cogens include prohibitions against 
slavery, torture, and genocide, and are sometimes labeled “peremptory norms.” See, e.g., Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
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person acted from fear of imminent and grave consequences, that the fear 
was “well-grounded,” and that the person had no real opportunity to 
escape to avoid committing the act. Almost in tandem, the domestic 
criminal law and international law reflect a concern that punishment be 
meted out in relationship to culpability and recognize that duress 
diminishes culpability. 
Immigration law is the straggler and outlier to this otherwise richly 
developed legal landscape. As seen through the small variations in Ana’s 
story, the duress doctrine manifests in very different ways in immigration 
law and with important gaps. It might reduce the likelihood of a criminal 
case feeding into immigration removals. It might provide affirmative 
benefits, in the case of our trafficking law—not merely a way to avoid 
removal but a means of accessing the elusive path to citizenship.19  
It is an express exception for people who were involuntary members of the 
Communist Party or other totalitarian parties. But it exists more in 
principle than in practice for those forced to support terrorists, and it offers 
nothing to asylum-seekers. As the greatest outlier, the treatment of duress 
in asylum law reveals the critical importance of expressly incorporating 
the duress defense and also harmonizing the understanding of  
the work done by the doctrine throughout immigration law. This Article 
concludes with a demand for a statutory solution because of the 
pervasiveness of the disharmony and because the structures that generate 
administrative common law are too unstable themselves to be trusted with 
resolving the issue. 
I. THE DURESS DOCTRINE’S LANDSCAPE AND JUSTIFICATIONS 
The doctrine of duress, in both domestic and international law, helps 
make sense of culpability for criminal conduct when that conduct is 
undertaken under great pressure and fear of significant negative 
consequences. Per Black’s Law Dictionary, duress is: 
[b]roadly, a threat of harm made to compel a person to do 
something against his or her will or judgment; . . . Duress 
practically destroys a person’s free agency, causing nonvolitional 
conduct because of the wrongful external pressure. . . . 
The use or threatened use of unlawful force—usu. that a 
reasonable person cannot resist—to compel someone to commit 
 
 19. See also AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, WHY DON’T IMMIGRANTS APPLY FOR CITIZENSHIP? 
(2019). See generally Elizabeth Keyes, Defining American: The Dream Act, Immigration Reform and 
Citizenship, 14 NEV. L.J. 101 (2013). 
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an unlawful act. Duress is a recognized defense to a crime, 
contractual breach, or tort.20 
Duress reduces, and sometimes removes, criminal culpability. 
In both settings, as set forth in greater detail in Parts I.B and I.C, there 
must be “a threat of force directed at the time of the [individual’s] conduct; 
a threat sufficient to induce a well-grounded fear of impending death or 
serious bodily injury; and [the individual must] lack a reasonable 
opportunity to escape harm other than by engaging in the illegal 
activity.”21 And in the international context, a fourth element, known as 
the proportionality element, limits the availability of the defense to 
situations where “the person does not intend to cause a greater harm than 
the one sought to be avoided.”22 
The literature on the duress defense is broad ranging, from moral 
philosophy and criminology to exegesis of the common law in domestic, 
foreign, and international contexts.23 The intent of this section is to provide 
sufficient understanding of the rationale for the defense, to identify the 
major articulations of it, and to help inform the discussion of duress in U.S. 
immigration law, which follows in Part II. 
A. Theoretical Bases for the Duress Defense 
Duress complicates two of the principal justifications underlying 
criminal law: deterrence and punishment. Someone who acts only under 
extreme coercion will not likely be deterred by the prospect of punishment 
under the law; embedded in the doctrine of duress is the notion that the 
coercion is fairly extreme. Likewise, someone who commits an act only 
because of coercion is, per most criminologists, policymakers, and moral 
philosophers alike, less culpable than someone who acts voluntarily.24 In 
the various iterations elaborated upon below, courts and legislatures 
attempt to balance the somewhat elusive idea of culpability, which 
includes a moral element, with traditional criminal justice values like 
 
 20. Duress, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 21. United States v. Gonzalez, 407 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 22. Martin Gottwald, Asylum Claims and Drug Offences: The Seriousness Threshold of Article 
1F(B) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the UN Drug Conventions, 18 
INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 81, 107 (2006). 
 23. See, e.g., infra notes 24, 30, and 60 for many of the interesting works. 
 24. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“This emphasis 
on culpability in sentencing decisions has long been reflected in Anglo-American jurisprudence. As 
this Court observed in Eddings, the common law has struggled with the problem of developing a 
capital punishment system that is ‘sensible to the uniqueness of the individual.’ Lockett and Eddings 
reflect the belief that punishment should be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal 
defendant. Thus, the sentence imposed at the penalty stage should reflect a reasoned moral response 
to the defendant’s background, character, and crime rather than mere sympathy or emotion.”). 
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deterrence and punishment.25 Whether (and to what extent) the duress 
defense exists is crucial to help answer the question of how criminally 
responsible someone is for actions they may not have wanted to commit. 
Deterrence is a core justification for criminal law punishments,26 and 
the founding architect of criminology, Cesare Beccaria, held the 
consequentialist view that the criminal’s intent should not matter, only 
their actions: 
They err, therefore, who imagine that a crime is greater, or less, 
according to the intention of the person by whom it is committed; 
for this will depend on the actual impression of objects on the 
senses, and on the previous disposition of the mind; both which 
will vary in different persons, and even in the same person at 
different times, according to the succession of ideas, passions, and 
circumstances. Upon that system, it would be necessary to form, 
not only a particular code for every individual, but a new penal 
law for every crime. Men, often with the best intention, do the 
greatest injury to society, and with the worst, do it the most 
essential services.27 
If intent does not matter, then any duress affecting the person’s 
actions (and diminishing intent) would also be irrelevant. However,  
as discussed in Parts I.B and I.C, most criminal laws, with the  
significant exception of homicide laws, do consider intent and factor 
duress into understanding whether that intent exists, or if it exists, whether 
it is excused. 
Duress undermines the deterrent argument for criminal punishments, 
and laws have evolved to permit questions of duress to affect culpability 
and criminal consequences. The concern is that someone is acting not 
because they disregard the (deterrent) consequences but because some 
greater harm would befall them if they did not engage in the conduct. 
 
 25. See infra Sections I.B.1 and I.C. 
 26. See also Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” 
Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 857 (2002) (“The principal consequentialist theories of 
punishment justify punishment based on the good consequences of rehabilitating the offender so that 
she will not commit future crimes, incapacitating the offender so that he cannot commit crimes during 
the term of imprisonment, deterring the offender from committing future crimes (specific deterrence), 
and deterring others in society from committing future crimes (general deterrence).”); Dan M. Kahan, 
The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 415 (1999) (citing JEREMY BENTHAM, 
THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1823)). See generally CESARE BONESANA DI 
BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS ch. XII (1764) (W.C. Little & Co. 1872) (“The 
end of punishment, therefore, is no other, than to prevent others from committing the like offence.”). 
 27. BECCARIA, supra note 26. 
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Coercion thus weakens the deterrent effect;28 Professor Dressler has 
commented that for someone “in thrall to some coercive power, the threat 
of criminal punishment is ineffective.”29 Elsewhere he writes that “we 
excuse the insane or coerced actor because she is undeterrable.”30 And 
while someone may commit a criminal act, their lack of criminal intent 
makes them less worthy of punishment. 
Punishment is another core objective of criminal law, separate from 
deterrence, and reflects the value of retribution (or, alternately, 
consequences for wrongdoers). Drawing upon Kantian ethics, Professor 
Russell Christopher writes, “[e]ssentially, retributivism justifies 
punishment based not on its consequences but solely because an offender 
deserves it. . . . Under retributivism, morally culpable wrongdoing or guilt 
deserves, merits, or warrants punishment. It is morally fitting that an 
offender should suffer in proportion to her desert or culpable 
wrongdoing.”31 
This question of who deserves punishment clearly raises an 
assignment of moral responsibility. Professor Stephen Massey grapples 
with legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart’s accounting of moral responsibility: 
[We] want to know to what extent the actor is morally 
blameworthy or morally obliged to make amends. Thus, the 
relevant inquiry considers not only the actor’s causal relation to 
the harm, but also such factors as the actor’s knowledge and 
ability to control his conduct. Assignment of responsibility in this 
sense carries with it the implication that the actor must answer or 
account for his conduct, and that he is properly blameworthy when 
he should and could have acted differently.32 
Duress factors into these italicized phrases—duress may affect  
the ability to control conduct and questions whether someone could have 
acted differently. 
 
 28. That might be the deterrent of incarceration or fines, social stigma, or other deterrents. See 
David Crump, Deterrence, 49 ST. MARY’S L.J. 317, 318 (2018) (“[T]he mechanism by which 
deterrence works remains elusive . . . .”). 
 29. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 300 (3d ed. 2001), accord Gregory F. 
Laufer, Admission Denied: In Support of a Duress Exception to the Immigration and Nationality Act’s 
“Material Support for Terrorism” Provision, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 437, 481 (2006). 
 30. Joshua Dressler, Justifications and Excuses: A Brief Review of the Concepts and the 
Literature, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1155, 1165 (1987). 
 31. Christopher, supra note 26, at 859. 
 32. Stephen J. Massey, Individual Responsibility for Assisting the Nazis in Persecuting Civilians, 
71 MINN. L. REV. 97, 138 (1986) (emphasis added). 
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B. Duress and Culpability in Domestic Criminal Law 
1. Defining Duress 
The duress defense has old origins in common law.33 The concept 
stems from an understanding that the intent—or mens rea—of the 
individual may matter greatly. While strict liability crimes certainly exist, 
including drug possession or statutory rape, many crimes require that  
the perpetrator have a requisite mental state.34 Duress may be a factor in 
understanding that requisite mental state. It does not negate the  
knowledge element of many crimes, but rather might be offered as a 
defense to excuse or justify the commission of a crime that might have 
been committed knowingly.35 
Defining the precise contours of the duress defense is a more 
challenging matter. All circuits have addressed the question of where 
duress exists, but they differ at the margins. Common to all circuits, the 
duress defense requires that the individual faced a highly serious negative 
consequences, like “an unlawful threat of imminent death or serious bodily 
injury.”36 More minor bodily injuries would not suffice nor would harm to 
property; these would be deemed insufficient excuses.37 The Court in 
United States v. Vigol explains why this seriousness matters: 
 
 33. See Commonwealth v. DeMarco, 809 A.2d 256, 261 (Pa. 2002) (legislature codified duress 
because the common law defense was too difficult for defendants to meet); State v. Riker, 869 P.2d 
43, 51 (Wash. 1994) (legislature created stringent duress statute due to the state’s skepticism and 
“reluctance to allow even the abnormal stresses of life to provide a basis for the defense”); see infra 
Part III for importance of codification. See generally Fatma E. Marouf, Invoking Federal Common 
Law Defenses in Immigration Cases, 66 UCLA L. REV. 142, 166–69 (2019). Increasingly, however, 
legislatures have stepped in to either codify the clear common law, or to clarify in the absence of such 
clarity. 
 34. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 707-702(1)(a) (West 2019) (requisite mental state for 
manslaughter statute is recklessness); ALA. CODE § 13A-6-3(a)(1) (1975) (“A person 
commits . . . manslaughter if . . . [they] recklessly cause[] the death of another . . . .”); see also N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 30-16-6 (West 1978) (“Fraud consists of the intentional misappropriation or taking of 
anything of value that belongs to another by means of fraudulent conduct, practices or 
representations.”). 
 35. See United States v. Haischer, 780 F.3d 1277, 1283–84 (9th Cir. 2015) (duress and the 
absence of the required mens rea are not the same thing, noting that “knowledge is not categorically 
inconsistent with duress”); United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 402 (1980) (“In the present case, 
we must examine both the mental element, or mens rea, required for conviction . . . and the 
circumstances under which the ‘evil-doing hand’ can avoid liability under that section because 
coercive conditions or necessity negates a conclusion of guilt even though the necessary mens rea was 
present.”). For a general discussion of whether duress is a justification or an excuse, see Madeline 
Engel, Comment, Unweaving the Dixon Blanket Rule: Flexible Treatment to Protect the Morally 
Innocent, 87 OR. L. REV. 1327, 1330–31 (2008). 
 36. Bailey, 444 U.S. at 409. 
 37. See L.I. Reiser, Annotation, Coercion, Compulsion, or Duress as Defense to Criminal 
Prosecution, 40 A.L.R.2d 908 (1955). 
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The apprehension of any loss of property, by waste, or fire; or 
even an apprehension of a slight or remote injury to the person, 
furnish no excuse. If, indeed, such circumstances could avail, it 
would be in the power of every crafty leader of tumults and 
rebellion, to indemnify his followers, by uttering previous 
menaces; an avenue would be forever open for the escape of 
unsuccessful guilt; and the whole fabric of society must, 
inevitably, be laid prostrate.38 
In some circuits, this principle looks more like a nexus requirement 
“that a direct causal relationship may be reasonably anticipated between 
the action taken and the avoidance of the harm.”39 In any event, speculative 
future harm will not be enough to satisfy this requirement.40 
Courts also agree that the threat of those consequences are not mere 
pressures or incentives but are “present, imminent, and impending, and of 
such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or 
serious bodily injury if the act is not done.”41 While this factor incorporates 
some of the same analysis as imminence and seriousness, its essence is 
whether the threat is believable. For example, the Fifth Circuit examined 
the past history between the defendant and the person making a threat to 
show whether the threat was “well-grounded.”42 Other formulations 
require a “reasonable belief” that the threat is true43 or “reasonable grounds 
for believing” the threat.44 
This requires an inquiry into the facts surrounding the threat, as a 
“fear which would be irrational in one set of circumstances may be 
well-grounded if the experience of the defendant with those applying the 
threat is such that the defendant can reasonably anticipate being harmed 
on failure to comply.”45 The Court of Appeals of Maryland urged this kind 
 
 38. United States v. Vigol, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 346, 347 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (with a footnote well 
worth reading, questioning why the jury in this case had to be found at a nearby bar before delivering 
their verdict). 
 39. Marouf, supra note 33, at 1674 (citing United States v. Lomax, 87 F.3d 959, 961 (8th Cir. 
1996)); see also United States v. Crittendon, 883 F.2d 326, 330 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. 
Harper, 802 F.2d 115, 117 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Agard, 605 F.2d 665, 667 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 40. See United States v. Nwoye, 663 F.3d 460, 463 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing R.I. Recreation Ctr., 
Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603, 604–05 (1st Cir. 1949) (affirming the denial of duress 
defense for defendant who was threatened by armed men who said they would “take care of” his family 
if he did not comply, because the threat was of “future unspecified harm”)). 
 41. Reiser, supra note 37, § 2 (emphasis added). This language is tantalizingly close to the core 
asylum concept of a “well-founded fear.” See infra Part III.B. 
 42. See United States v. Willis, 38 F.3d 170, 177 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 43. See People v. Williamson, 218 Cal. Rptr. 550, 559 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Byrd v. 
Commonwealth, 16 S.E. 727, 729 (Va. 1893). 
 44. See Reese v. State, 869 So. 2d 1225, 1227 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
 45. Debra Oakes, Annotation, Availability of Defense of Duress or Coercion in Prosecution for 
Violation of Federal Narcotics Laws, 71 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 481 § 4 (2013). 
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of fact-rich understanding in McMillan v. State.46 The lower court had 
limited duress to one very specific context, finding that “for duress to 
occur, there has to be a situation in which someone is, in effect, holding a 
gun to his head at the time that he commits the crime, and that didn’t 
happen.”47 Instead, the court reasoned that 
[w]hile the trial court’s example illustrates an obvious situation of 
duress, we do not agree that it constitutes the entire universe of the 
scenarios that can suffice as coercive. Being threatened with 
weapons is not the only possibility. A jury may infer from witness 
testimony, including that of a defendant, that threats by identified 
gang members . . . when no weapons are displayed or when there 
are no weapons, that the defendant had a “well-grounded 
apprehension of death or serious bodily injury.”48 
Circuits and legislatures are divided over how objective this standard 
is in the relatively well-developed setting of Battered Person Syndrome.49 
All circuits do agree that the defense of duress only works where there is 
a lack of a reasonable opportunity to escape harm other than by engaging 
in the illegal activity.50 Included in the reasonableness of escape is the idea 
that the individual must seek out police aid or protection.51 
The three core requirements of the duress doctrine thus far are that 
(1) the defendant faced a highly serious negative consequence, (2) the 
threat of that consequence was believable, and (3) the defendant 
reasonably believed they would be harmed if they failed to comply. 
Beyond these three requirements, other circuits have added additional 
elements. One additional element is akin to an assumption-of-the-risk 
 
 46. See McMillan v. State, 51 A.3d 623 (Md. 2012). 
 47. Id. at 637 (quoting the trial court). 
 48. Id. 
 49. The complexities of that area of law are beyond the scope of this article, but the comparisons 
are worth exploration in future scholarship. See generally Sarah M. Buel, Effective Assistance of 
Counsel for Battered Women Defendants: A Normative Construct, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 217, 311 
(2003) (“Outside the cases where an abuse victim killed her batterer, courts and feminist legal 
scholarship have recognized that battered women can be coerced or forced into unlawful conduct, 
providing a basis for a duress defense.”). To the extent the two areas of law have already been 
compared, the scholarship focuses on “battered women” claims to asylum. See, e.g., Marisa Silenzi 
Cianciarulo & Claudia David, Pulling the Trigger: Separation Violence as a Basis for Refugee 
Protection for Battered Women, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 337 (2009). 
 50. See United States v. Diaz, 736 F.3d 1143, 1150 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Gonzalez, 
407 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 51. United States v. Scott, 901 F.2d 871, 874 (10th Cir. 1990) (A defendant with such “countless 
opportunities to contact law enforcement authorities or [to] escape the perceived threats” cannot as a 
matter of law avail herself of the duress defense). But see United States v. Lopez, 913 F.3d 807, 822 
(9th Cir. 2019) (“[A] jury may consider the defendant’s prior experience with police response to abuse 
in determining whether it was reasonable for her not to contact [the police] once threatened by the 
coercing party.”). 
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principle; courts have held that the defense is unavailable where an 
individual voluntarily, recklessly, or negligently placed themselves in a 
situation in which it was probable that one would be subject to duress.52 
Similarly, the Sixth and Eighth Circuits add a requirement that the illegal 
conduct lasted only as long as it was “absolutely necessary.”53 As 
discussed in the next section, international and foreign law addressing 
duress likewise typically have more than three requirements, so the Sixth 
and Eighth Circuits are in line with that more detailed understanding.54 
Concerning proportionality, the individual cannot invoke a duress 
defense if the act they commit is worse than the harm they fear. This 
proportionality limitation requires an investigation into and comparison of 
what the individual fears and what the individual is coerced into doing.55 
Thus, the defense is not available for homicide, as multiple courts and 
legislatures have made clear.56 However, even in the homicide context, it 
may have some impact—it can be a defense to felony-murder57  
and can reduce a homicide charge to manslaughter.58 One legislature has 
clarified that it is not available for robbery59 and another for crimes 
punishable by death.60 
The Model Penal Code has also addressed this question, defining 
duress in these terms: 
It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct 
charged to constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so 
by the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person 
 
 52. See United States v. Nolan, 700 F.2d 479, 484 (9th Cir. 1983); see also United States v. 
Paolello, 951 F.2d 537, 541 (3d Cir. 1991) (defendant must not have recklessly put themselves into 
the situation where the duress arose); United States v. Blanco, 754 F.2d 940, 943 (11th Cir. 1985) (like 
the Paolello holding, except that the standard is “recklessly or negligently” (emphasis added)). 
 53. United States v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 464, 468 (6th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Stover, 
822 F.2d 48, 50 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding the duress defense unavailable because when the police 
arrived, the defendant was “no longer in any imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury”). 
 54. See infra Part I.C. 
 55. PAUL H. ROBINSON, 2 CRIM. L. DEF. § 177 (2020) (duress as an excuse defense). 
 56. See generally R.I. Recreation Ctr., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir. 
1949); State v. Toscano, 378 A.2d 755, 761 (N.J. 1977); State v. Rumble, 680 S.W.2d 939, 942 
(Mo. 1984) (“Section 562.071.2 in unmistakably clear language declares that duress is not a defense 
to the crime of murder—any murder.”). 
 57. See McMillan v. State, 51 A.3d 623, 634–35 (Md. 2012) (permitting the duress defense in 
reference to felony-murder, where the defense would excuse the underlying felony—as opposed to 
excluding the murder itself (emphasis added)). 
 58. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.08 (West 1963) (by statute, if one is forced to intentionally kill 
another under duress, murder charge is dropped to manslaughter). 
 59. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-5-1 (West 1977); see also Ballard v. State, 464 N.E.2d 328, 330 
(Ind. 1984) (no duress defense is available for the crime of robbery). 
 60. NEV. REV. STAT. § 194.010(8) (West 1911); see also Cabrera v. State, 454 P.3d 722, 724 
(Nev. 2019) (“The statute plainly states that duress is not a defense when ‘the crime is punishable [by] 
death.’”). 
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or the person of another, that a person of reasonable firmness in 
his situation would have been unable to resist.61 
Notably absent from the Code’s definition is a proportionality 
requirement; nothing in this definition rules out the defense categorically 
even for the charge of murder.62 
2. When Duress Matters in the Criminal Legal System 
Duress matters in four different phases of the criminal process. First, 
facts like Ana’s, from the introduction, might cause a prosecutor to decline 
to prosecute as an exercise in prosecutorial discretion.63 Second, duress 
might shape what kind of plea deal a prosecutor offers.64 Third, for cases 
that avoid plea bargaining and go to trial, proof of duress could sufficiently 
negate the mens rea the prosecutor is required to prove. Finally, duress can 
be a mitigating factor in sentencing. As Professor Chiao writes, 
“[a]lthough there are famous disputes about mitigating and aggravating 
conditions for criminal acts generally, these disputes should not blind us 
to large swaths of relatively stable agreement—for instance, . . . that 
duress and infancy tend to exculpate[.]”65 
C. Duress and Culpability in International Law 
A similarly rich body of law is developing in public international 
law, and specifically in international criminal law and international 
refugee law. Developments in these two areas then inform a third area: 
 
 61. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (AM. L. INST. 1962). 
 62. See Benjamin J. Risacher, Note, No Excuse: The Failure of the ICC’s Article 31 “Duress” 
Definition, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1403, 1411 (2014) (noting that the Code definition “encapsulates 
the idea that the will has been overcome and therefore, without a free choice, there can be no moral 
culpability”). 
 63. “The decision to charge or decline charges is totally within the discretion of the prosecutor.” 
Angela J. Davis, The Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to End Mass Incarceration, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
1063, 1071 (2016). 
 64. As Professor Peter Margulies describes,  
Equity . . . is equally important to the legitimacy of plea bargaining. In a democratic system, 
plea bargaining should avoid both the caprice of treating like cases differently and the 
cruelty of ignoring differences in defendants’ circumstances. A plea bargaining system 
injures the cause of equity if it permits wildly disparate results for similarly situated 
defendants, singles out particular classes of defendants for harsh treatment, or ignores 
individualizing factors such as duress, which should mitigate culpability or punishment. 
Peter Margulies, Battered Bargaining: Domestic Violence and Plea Negotiation in the Criminal 
Justice System, 11 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 153, 155 (2001). 
 65. Vincent Chiao, Ex Ante Fairness in Criminal Law and Procedure, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 
277, 291 (2012). But see Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 
141–42 (2008) (“In legal practice, criminal attorneys spend much of their time arguing about the 
appropriate sentence after a guilty plea, not the best fit between the likely facts and the most apt code 
section. . . . The real action in criminal practice happens at sentencing, and there the defendant’s mental 
state stays on the periphery—note how little the federal sentencing guidelines discuss mens rea.”). 
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foreign law that incorporates the evolving international legal norms. This 
section addresses each of these three areas in turn. 
1. International Criminal Law 
International criminal law has been defined with varying degrees of 
breadth, but it essentially concerns violations of public international laws, 
which may arise from traditional norms (such as laws against genocide 
and piracy) or from treaties. This section briefly describes the two 
principal developments in this arena that concern duress: (1) crimes 
against humanity and (2) grounds for excluding criminal responsibility. 
First, with the increase in international criminal tribunals since the 
1990s,66 there have been more opportunities to define and examine the 
understanding of duress in this body of law. The major case doing so is 
Prosecutor v. Erdemović in the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia (ICTY).67 In that case, the ICTY court held that “duress does 
not afford a complete defence to a soldier charged with a crime against 
humanity and/or a war crime involving the killing of innocent human 
beings.”68 In reaching this decision, the judges searched for a unifying 
principle from existing international common law; finding none, they 
decided to interpret the duress doctrine from the perspective of the ICTY’s 
strongly protective purpose and ruled on the unavailability of the defense 
for murder.69 
Second, subsequent to Erdemović, the major development 
internationally has been the International Criminal Court (ICC), created 
through the 1998 Rome Statute, and entering into force in 2002.70 The 
 
 66. The 1990s gave rise to two of the first such tribunals: the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. See generally International 
Tribunals, UNITED NATIONS SEC. COUNCIL, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/repertoire 
/international-tribunals [https://perma.cc/G433-5U2X]. 
 67. Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997). 
 68. Id. ¶ 19. 
 69. Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald 
and Judge Vohrah ¶ 75 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997) (“We must bear in 
mind that we are operating in the realm of international humanitarian law which has, as one of its 
prime objectives, the protection of the weak and vulnerable in such a situation where their lives and 
security are endangered.”). But see Risacher, supra note 62, at 1420 (“General deterrence is thought 
to help prevent future crimes by members of society at large by making an example and punishing an 
actor for his criminal behavior. The problem is that coerced individuals are not thinking about avoiding 
punishment from a legal body; rather they have had their free will overcome by a threat that no 
reasonable person could resist. In a similar vein, an individual who has the unfortunate fate of finding 
himself under coercion twice is not going to give weight to the fact that he was previously punished 
for a similar act.”). 
 70. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 
[hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
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Rome Statute codified a definition at Article 31 (“Grounds for excluding 
criminal responsibility”), Section (1)(d): 
The conduct which is alleged to constitute a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court has been caused by duress resulting from 
a threat of imminent death or of continuing or imminent serious 
bodily harm against that person or another person, and the person 
acts necessarily and reasonably to avoid this threat, provided that 
the person does not intend to cause a greater harm than the one 
sought to be avoided. Such a threat may either be: (i) Made by 
other persons; or (ii) Constituted by other circumstances beyond 
that person’s control.71 
This definition overlaps with that described in U.S. domestic 
criminal law: (1) an emphasis on imminent harm, (2) reasonable actions 
needed to avoid the threat, and (3) proportionality of the conduct.72 While 
new to public international law, this third element—the proportionality 
approach, which essentially precludes the defense in cases of homicide—
can be seen throughout common law jurisdictions internationally.73 
One case before the ICC has raised this defense, the case of Dominic 
Ongwen, an alleged commander in the Lord’s Resistance Army in 
Uganda.74 He has sought to avail of the defense under Article 31(1)(d), but 
as of this writing, there has been no final decision in his case.75 
 
 71. Id. at art. 31(1)(d). 
 72. See generally Jennifer Bond, Principled Exclusions: A Revised Approach to Article 1(F)(A) 
of the Refugee Convention, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 15, 48–56 (2013). 
 73. Joseph Rikhof, War Criminals Not Welcome; How Common Law Countries Approach the 
Phenomenon of International Crimes in the Immigration and Refugee Context, 
21 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 453, 507 (2009) (statement of Joseph Rikhof from his study of Australia, 
Canada, and New Zealand) (“The defence . . . has been considered in all countries under consideration 
and, . . . the other four [non-U.S.] countries allow the defence, if all requirements are present, 
including, most importantly, that of proportionality between the harm to be inflicted and the harm to 
be received.”). But see Risacher, supra note 62, at 1408 (finding that civil law jurisdictions are far less 
likely to expressly preclude the defense even for homicide). 
 74. Prosecutor v. Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/15, Defence Notification Pursuant to Rules 79(2) and 
80(1) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence ¶ 5 (Aug. 9, 2016), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_05556.pdf [https://perma.cc/RS8D-CN8M] (“(a) Any alleged acts 
committed during the temporal jurisdiction outlined by Pre-Trial Chamber II would have been 
committed under duress; (b) The duress would have been caused by Joseph Kony and his close 
advisors; (c) The duress would have come from a continuing threat of imminent death and imminent 
threat of serious bodily harm against Mr[.] Ongwen and against other persons which was beyond Mr[.] 
Ongwen’s control; and (d) Mr[.] Ongwen’s alleged intended conduct is not alleged to have caused a 
greater harm than the one which was avoided.”). 
 75. The status of the case can be found at the International Criminal Tribunal’s website for the 
case. Ongwen Case, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/uganda/ongwen [https://perma.cc/ 
LLK9-EPTD]. 
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2. International Refugee Law 
Duress law is far more richly developed in international refugee law. 
The grounds for denying protection to an otherwise eligible refugee arise 
from Article 1F(b) of the Refugee Convention,76 also known as the 
“exclusion clauses.”77 These clauses are where the duty not to return 
refugees crosses with the right of states to self-protection, which would be 
the concern for people accused of criminal or persecutory acts. 
International understanding of the bars to refugee protection strongly 
favors a cautious approach to denying protection to otherwise eligible 
individuals—first by reserving the bars for the most compelling and 
serious cases, and second by permitting a duress defense. 
To establish the Refugee Convention, nations wanted assurance that 
they would not be required to allow dangerous individuals who would be 
a threat to the public safety of the receiving country.78 That context 
matters, for it is not every criminal offense that limits the protections of 
the Convention, but only highly serious ones. Interpreting both the 
Convention and its founding documents (the travaux preparatoires), the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR) states that 
only capital crimes or “very grave punishable act[s]” fall under this ground 
for denying asylum.79 Separate UNHCR guidance lists “homicide, rape, 
arson and armed robbery” as the kinds of crimes covered, and notes that 
“certain other offenses could also be deemed serious if they are 
accompanied by the use of deadly weapons, serious injury to persons, 
evidence of habitual criminal conduct and other similar factors.”80 In short, 
UNHCR states “[c]onsidering the serious consequences of exclusion for 
the person concerned . . . the interpretation of these exclusion clauses must 
be restrictive.”81 
Even if someone were to have committed a serious nonpolitical 
crime by this more stringent definition, though, international refugee law 
 
 76. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter 
Refugee Convention]. Refugee Convention duties are incorporated by reference in the  
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, art.1, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. 
267, 268–70. 
 77. Off. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, The Exclusion Clauses: Guidelines on Their 
Application ¶ 4 (Dec. 1996) [hereinafter The Exclusion Clauses]. 
 78. James C. Hathaway & Colin J. Harvey, Framing Refugee Protection in the New World 
Disorder, 34 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 257, 262 (2001) (“[T]he Refugee Convention’s drafters recognized 
the importance of reassuring states that accession to international refugee law would not require them 
to admit either international criminals or fugitives from justice.”). 
 79. Off. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for 
Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status 
of Refugees, ¶ 155, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/Rev.1 (Jan. 1992) [hereinafter UNHCR Handbook]. 
 80. The Exclusion Clauses, supra note 77, ¶ 51. 
 81. UNHCR Handbook, supra note 79, ¶ 149 (emphasis added). 
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allows for a duress defense, and for special consideration of offenses 
committed by minors. UNHCR offers this balancing test for the  
duress exception: 
As for duress, this applies where the act in question results from 
the person concerned necessarily and reasonably avoiding a threat 
of imminent death, or of continuing or imminent serious bodily 
harm to him- or herself or another person, and the person does not 
intend to cause greater harm than the one sought to be avoided.82 
This definition mirrors that of the Rome Statute with its three requirements 
of imminent harm, proportionality, and reasonableness.83 
The origins and interpretation of the Refugee Convention also 
require a special focus on how duress affects the criminal culpability of 
minors. Despite the Convention’s lack of an explicit exception for minors, 
UNHCR advises that the exclusion clauses do apply to minors, but only 
for those of sufficient age and mental capacity to be criminally 
responsible: “Given the vulnerability of children, great care should be 
exercised in considering exclusion with respect to a minor and defences 
such as duress should in particular be examined carefully.”84 This 
understanding of the applicability of the duress defense makes sense in 
light of the purpose of Article 1(F) of the Refugee Convention, which 
focuses on the integrity of the refugee system.85 The system is built upon 
some notion of who “deserv[es]” protection, and excludes war criminals, 
human rights violators and others.86 If someone committed an act without 
requisite intent—either because of duress or age—then that person is not 
the kind of danger that the exclusion clauses concern. As one commentator 
has noted, it would be manifestly unfair to incorporate only some aspects 
of criminal law in analyzing these bars:  
All of these elements must also be considered in the refugee 
context—it is arbitrary and unjust for refugee law to rely on criminal 
concepts while ignoring certain aspects of the doctrine and key 
underlying principles, including the need for autonomous will.87 
 
 82. Off. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection: 
Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/03/05 (Sept. 4, 2003) [hereinafter UNHCR Exclusion Clauses]. 
 83. Rome Statute, supra note 70. 
 84. UNHCR Exclusion Clauses, supra note 77, ¶ 28. 
 85. Refugee Convention, supra note 76, at art. 1F. 
 86. UNHCR Handbook, supra note 79, at ch. IV § B(3); see also Matter of McMullen, 
19 I. & N. Dec. 90, 97 (B.I.A. 1984) (“This exclusion from refugee status under the Act represents the 
view that those who have participated in the persecution of others are unworthy and not deserving of 
international protection.”). 
 87. Jennifer Bond, The Defence of Duress in Canadian Refugee Law, 41 QUEEN’S L.J. 409, 418 
(2016). 
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3. Foreign Law Interpreting the Refugee Convention 
Countries with case law illuminating the availability of a duress 
defense generally follow the same principles laid out in both the U.S. 
criminal law and international law settings but with some inclusion of 
additional factors, as described here. This section is far from exhaustive 
but highlights recent or significant cases from countries with  
well-developed asylum jurisprudence. 
Canada looked to international law in formulating its test for duress88 
but has gone beyond it to establish the most detailed test of any country. 
The Canadian test lays out six factors needed for a successful duress 
defense. There must be (1) an explicit or implied threat of death or bodily 
harm; (2) a reasonable belief the threat would be carried out; (3) no safe 
avenue of escape; (4) a close temporal connection between the threat and 
harm threatened (but does not include threats of future harm); (5) 
proportionality between harm threatened and harm inflicted; and (6) the 
accused did not voluntarily partake in groups activities knowing that 
threats and coercion were a possible result.89 
One case from Canada situates the analysis at the very initial stage, 
whether the exclusion clauses are triggered at all. In Canada v. Maan,90 an 
Indian man knowingly carried drugs after a militant group threatened him 
and his family members with death. The Canadian Immigration and 
Refugee Board, reviewing his case, “found that there were not ‘serious 
reasons for considering’ that the Respondent committed a crime, given the 
presence of duress, and the lack of a mens rea, therefore the Convention 
exclusion does not apply.”91 On appeal by the Government, the court 
accepted this reasoning.92 This initial inapplicability of the exclusion 
grounds matters profoundly because, unlike in the criminal legal system 
where duress often works as a mitigating factor in sentencing, there is no 
“mitigation” equivalent in asylum cases because the applicant is either 
granted asylum or not. As will be discussed in Part IV, the duress doctrine 
is thus helpful as a funneling device, taking the asylum bars out of 
contention from the outset.93 
 
 88. See id. at 426–28. Sources included the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg, Statutes and jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR, and the provisions of the Rome Statute 
of the ICC. 
 89. R. v. Ryan, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 14 (Can.). Note that the availability of the defense does not mean 
it is terribly successful. Bond notes that of twenty cases where the defense was raised, 70% failed, 
most often because they lacked the required “imminence” to prevail in the six-part test. Bond, supra 
note 87, at 424–25. 
 90. Canada v. Maan, [2007] F.C. 583 (Can. Ont.). 
 91. Id. ¶ 9. 
 92. Id. ¶¶ 24–26. 
 93. See infra Part III. 
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New Zealand has focused on the individual’s intent in duress (or 
coercion) cases, looking at whether the individual had a “shared common 
purpose” with the people directing them to commit the crimes.94 One such 
case involved a Sri Lankan young man whom the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) 
forced (by credible death threats against him and remaining family 
members) to report on members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam 
(LTTE), which put those people at “grave risk of being tortured by the 
SLA.”95 The central issue for the court was “the mens rea ingredient and 
the degree of appellant’s complicity in the actions of the LTTE and the 
SLA.”96 The court did “not consider that the appellant at any time shared 
a common purpose with either the SLA or the LTTE. He was coerced into 
providing assistance by both organisations. The LTTE threatened to  
kill him and his family.”97 The court engaged in no further analysis of 
components of duress, except to cite to the treatise by refugee law scholar 
James Hathaway that seeks the absence of intent where someone  
acted “only in order to avoid grave and imminent peril” that a reasonable 
person would believe was imminent and that the conduct was not “in 
excess of that which would otherwise have been directed at the person 
alleging coercion.”98 
The United Kingdom makes the duress defense an initial evidentiary 
burden to “raise a ground for excluding criminal responsibility”  to see if 
the person actually comes under the application of the Refugee 
Convention’s Exclusion Clauses99 and applies the Rome Statute for 
substantive understanding of those clauses.100 In 2016, the U.K.’s 
administrative Upper Tribunal issued a decision in AB and The Secretary 
of State for the Home Department.101 The Tribunal considered both the 
Rome Statute and the Erdemovic case in grappling with duress. The case 
involved a former Iranian women’s prison guard who, after a decade in 
lower level work, assumed a position where she transferred inmates over 
to the Intelligence Services, where they were presumably tortured.102 She 
testified fearing that, “if she had left without permission[,] she would have 
been treated as a traitor, imprisoned, tortured and perhaps raped.”103 Citing 
 
 94. Refugee Appeal No. 74646, [2003] NZRSAA 261 ¶ 52 (June 26, 2003) https://forms.justice. 
govt.nz/search/Documents/IPTV2/RefugeeProtection/ref_20030626_74646.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
7PYR-5GUB]. See generally Rikhof, supra note 71. 
 95. Refugee Appeal No. 74646, [2003] NZRSAA ¶ 51. 
 96. Id. ¶ 52. 
 97. Id. ¶ 53. 
 98. Id. ¶ 54 (quoting JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 218 (1st ed. 1991)). 
 99. AB v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2016] UKUT 00376 (IAC).  
 100. Id. [19]. 
 101. Id. [82]–[83]. 
 102. Id. [8]–[13]. 
 103. Id. [16]. 
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Rome Statute Art. 30(2),104 the court found there were serious reasons  
to believe she had committed a crime against humanity and then turned  
to the question of duress as an excuse.105 It found that Erdemovic was not 
binding and had been superseded by the Rome Statute.106 Significantly, 
the court placed the burden on the Government to “establish that there  
are serious reasons for considering that the appellant did not act  
under duress.”107 
The U.K. court read Article 31 of the Rome Statute as having five 
components: (1) threat of imminent death or other serious harm; (2) threat 
made beyond the control of the applicant; (3) threat directed against the 
applicant or “some other” undefined person; (4) the applicant acted 
“necessarily and reasonably to avoid this threat;” and (5) the harm caused 
was not greater than the harm avoided (the proportionality requirement).108 
The particular applicant in AB failed to meet several aspects of this test, 
and her appeal failed, raising the important point—before this Article turns 
to duress in immigration law—that the existence of a duress defense 
clearly does not mean the defense will be successful. However, the ability 
to plead that defense decreases the chances that someone will be 
erroneously excluded from protection, against the intentions of the 
Refugee Convention. 
II. DURESS INCOHERENCE IN IMMIGRATION LAW 
This Part of the Article will consider the different areas where duress 
matters, in a descending order from most beneficial to the noncitizen, to 
least. Interestingly, two of those more preferential areas exist in the realm 
of the government’s two longstanding high priorities for removal: people 
involved in criminal activity, and people engaged in terrorist activity. As 
will be shown, for these two groups the existence of duress matters 
greatly—a fact that is implicit in noncitizen engagement in the criminal 
legal system, and explicit in the context of the terrorism grounds of 
inadmissibility and removability. At the opposite end of the scale is the 
deeply puzzling realm of asylum law, where the mere idea of the duress 
doctrine is deeply contested. This section lays out the state of the duress 
doctrine in each area before turning to the rationales and methods for 
resolving this puzzle in the conclusion. 
 
 104. Id. [21] (“For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where: (a) In relation to 
conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct; (b) in relation to a consequence, that person 
means to cause that consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.” 
(quoting art. 30 of the Rome Statute)). 
 105. Id. [80]. 
 106. Id. [52]. 
 107. Id. [62] (emphasis added). 
 108. Id. [63]. 
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A. A Descending Hierarchy of Duress 
The descending hierarchy sketched out below rests upon two 
assessments. First, eligibility for immigration benefits is the ideal and 
avoiding removal proceedings is less ideal but still valuable for the 
noncitizen. Second, in looking at grounds of inadmissibility and 
deportability, it is better to meet an exception (and thus not have the 
ground apply at all) than to qualify to apply for a discretionary waiver. But 
both of these are better than legal scenarios where relief is  
foreclosed entirely. With those assessments in mind, this section looks at 
duress as the basis for a trafficking visa, duress as a limiting factor in  
crimmigration-based removals, duress as an exception and waiver to 
inadmissibility and removal grounds, and then denaturalization and 
asylum, where the relevance of duress remains contested. 
1. Duress as a Basis for Relief: Human Trafficking 
As discussed in the opening story about Ana, immigration law 
expressly provides a benefit to a subset of people who have endured 
duress: victims of “a severe form of human trafficking.”109 The Act  
defines this as: 
(A) sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by 
force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to 
perform such act has not attained 18 years of age; or 
(B) the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or 
obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of 
force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to 
involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery.110 
Although the definition of a trafficking victim uses the word 
“coercion” and not “duress,” the two terms are used interchangeably in 
criminal law to mean the same thing.111 Notably, age functions as a proxy 
for duress in the definition of sex trafficking in Subsection A. While older 
victims of sex trafficking need to establish some aspect of force, fraud, or 
coercion in order to qualify as a victim of a severe form of trafficking, 
those below the age of eighteen qualify without making any such showing; 
their young age removes their culpability in commercial sex work and 
makes them victims rather than perpetrators.112 
 
 109. INA § 101(a)(15)(T)(i)(I); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)(i)(I). 
 110. 22 U.S.C. § 7102(11) (emphasis added). 
 111. See United States v. Logan, 49 F.3d 352, 359 (8th Cir. 1995); State v. Baker, 197 P.3d 421, 
427 (Kan. 2008). 
 112. Megan Annitto, Consent, Coercion, and Compassion: Emerging Legal Responses to the 
Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Minors, 30 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 39–43 (2011) (tracing the 
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The benefits of meeting this definition are significant. A successful 
applicant for the “T” visa, which is available to victims of trafficking, will 
have a visa and work authorization for a four-year period.113 In the fourth 
year, the applicant may apply for permanent residence, which puts them 
on the track to citizenship five years later.114 Furthermore, the individual 
may initially receive an array of time-limited public benefits, from food 
stamps to public housing.115 
How does duress show up in typical T visa cases? As in the story told 
at the outset, a nineteen-year-old forced (under threat of rape) by a gang 
member to engage in extortion or carry drugs could be defined by law 
enforcement as a trafficking victim and not as a perpetrator. The gang 
member has obtained her for involuntary servitude through coercion—a 
clear fit within the statutory eligibility requirements. She would also have 
to be willing to cooperate in a criminal investigation of his trafficking and 
show why returning to her home country would cause extreme hardship. 
Upon showing these things, she can earn the valuable T visa. 
These visas are not limited to such dramatic stories. A domestic 
worker compelled by threats against her family members to work in her 
employer’s office, where the employer commits Medicare fraud, would be 
a victim of trafficking and not be considered someone who aided and 
abetted fraud. An undocumented day laborer whose employer threatens 
him with his gun when he asks for a month of unpaid wages would be 
eligible to apply for a T visa, instead of being removable for having 
entered illegally. And a girl below the age of eighteen who engages in sex 
work at someone else’s behest is defined as a victim of trafficking whether 
she perceived herself to be coerced or not. In each of these diverse cases, 
the duress the individuals experience is more significant than any illegal 
conduct that they engaged in under duress.116 
 
evolving understanding of minors’ culpability in sex work); Jennifer M. Chacón, Misery and Myopia: 
Understanding the Failures of U.S. Efforts to Stop Human Trafficking, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2977, 
2989–90 (2006). 
 113. Victims of Human Trafficking: T Nonimmigrant Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. 
SERVS. (May 5, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/victims-of-human-trafficking-and-other-
crimes/victims-of-human-trafficking-t-nonimmigrant-status [https://perma.cc/YNL6-6DY7]. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See, e.g., Elizabeth Keyes, CASA of Maryland and the Battle Regarding Human Trafficking 
and Domestic Workers’ Rights, 7 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 14, 17 (2007). It is 
possible that the conduct (from illegal entry to prostitution) would need a waiver of inadmissibility for 
the visa to be granted, but in the author’s extensive experience with T visa applications, waivers are 
more easily obtainable in that context than many others—precisely because any illegal conduct is 
usually linked to the trafficking itself. 
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2. Duress as a Means of Avoiding the Removal Process: 
“Crimmigration” 
The intersection of criminal law with immigration law, known 
popularly as crimmigration, refers in large part to the ways that criminal 
conduct triggers a variety of immigration consequences.117 While this 
might simply refer to how an arrest brings an individual to the attention of 
Department of Homeland Security, through the imposition of an 
immigration “detainer,” it often refers to the way criminal conduct118 
makes an individual either inadmissible to the country (if never legally 
admitted before) or deportable (for all those who had been, at some point 
prior, legally admitted). Particularly for the latter category of people, the 
conduct might be the only basis the government has to remove someone, 
so for them to establish deportability, they must show that the conduct fits 
one of the criminal grounds of deportability—for example, showing that 
it was an “aggravated felony” (defined for immigration purposes at 
INA § 101(a)(43) and famously not required to be either aggravated or a 
felony) or that it was a Crime Involving Moral Turpitude committed within 
five years of entry, among others.119 
Duress does not directly appear in any of the exceptions or waivers 
for these criminal grounds of inadmissibility or deportability. However, 
because those grounds are almost entirely based upon convictions, the 
duress defense is implicitly incorporated completely co-equivalent to how 
it shows up in criminal law (domestic or foreign, depending on where the 
conviction occurred).120 For example, imagine someone arrested in New 
York and charged with committing the crime of assault in the first-degree, 
which requires intent and which would constitute an aggravated felony if 
the sentence imposed after a conviction were more than one year.121 In the 
course of the criminal legal process, if the person establishes a duress 
defense, the charges might be dropped to a lesser crime with less severe 
 
 117. See generally Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign 
Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 377 (2006). As described in the introduction, this term was coined by 
Professor Juliet Stumpf to encompass the myriad ways that the criminal legal system and immigration 
laws intersect. 
 118. See generally Alia Al-Khatib & Jayesh Rathod, Equity in Contemporary Immigration 
Enforcement: Defining Contributions and Countering Criminalization, 66 U. KAN. L. REV. 951, 954 
(2018). The word “conduct” is carefully chosen because there are a number of ways that conduct, 
absent an arrest or conviction, is sufficient to bar individuals from securing status or fighting removal. 
 119. See generally INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). 
 120. The criminal grounds of inadmissibility include criminal activity (not necessarily 
convictions) committed in the United States and other countries. INA § 212(a)(2); 
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2). 
 121. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.10 (McKinney 1996). For analysis of the immigration 
consequences, see REPRESENTING IMMIGRANT DEFENDANTS IN NEW YORK Appendix A (5th ed. 
2011). 
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immigration consequences.122 The individual who can avail themselves of 
the duress defense in the criminal proceeding will either avoid an 
immigration removal case or have much easier time in the immigration 
system as a result.123 
The cases that reach Immigration Court through the criminal legal 
system thus already benefit from the duress defense to the extent that 
defense was available in the criminal case. 
3. Duress as an Express Exception: The “Totalitarian Bar” 
Another ground of inadmissibility to the U.S. applies to “any 
immigrant who is or has been a member of or affiliated with the 
Communist or any other totalitarian party (or subdivision or affiliate 
thereof), domestic or foreign.”124 However, the statute provides two ways 
that an otherwise inadmissible immigrant could legally enter the United 
States: (1) an exception specifically for those whose membership “is or 
was involuntary, or is or was solely when under sixteen years of age, by 
operation of law, or for purposes of obtaining employment, food rations, 
or other essentials of living and whether necessary for such purposes”125 
and (2) the opportunity to apply for a waiver.126 
With regard to the exception, not only is there this double safeguard 
built into this particular ground of inadmissibility, but for more than fifty 
years, courts have broadened the understanding of this exception even 
beyond the plain text. For example, a 2020 case discussed a Chinese 
woman who became a Communist Party member in China as an adult, 
believing it was the only way to get a job later. When U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS) denied her naturalization application, she 
argued both the express exception “membership for purposes of obtaining 
employment” and the “jurisprudential ‘meaningful association’ 
exception.”127 This jurisprudential line flows from cases like Galvan v. 
Press, in 1954, where the Court expressed discomfort with First 
Amendment issues as the United States attempted to deport Communists 
 
 122. Id. I do not know what the typical alternate charge would be, or if a duress case would 
simply be dropped, but lesser assault offenses are not likely to rise to the level of aggravated felonies. 
 123. See generally MARY E. KRAMER, IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY 
129–51 (8th ed. 2019). 
 124. INA § 212(a)(3)(D)(i); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(D)(i). 
 125. Id. In Rowoldt v. Perfetto, Justice Frankfurter also read a kind of “de minimis” approach 
into the language of the preceding version of this statute, allowing a long-time permanent resident to 
stay in the United States despite his voluntary membership. Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115 (1957). 
 126. INA § 212(a)(3)(D)(iv); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(D)(iv). 
 127. Mingyu Zhu v. Miller, No. 3:19-CV-00035-AC, 2020 WL 1330235, at *3 (D. Or. Feb. 3, 
2020), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Crosby v. Miller, No. 3:19-CV-00035-AC, 2020 
WL 1324996 (D. Or. Mar. 20, 2020). 
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in the 1940s and 1950s.128 The Supreme Court was concerned with too 
broadly assigning culpability to Communist Party members, first reaching 
into the legislative history in Galvan v. Press to require a meaningful 
association,129 and later redefining what membership itself meant even for 
self-identified party members in Rowoldt v. Perfetto.130 
This lenient jurisprudence met with criticism at the time, in a dissent 
by Justice Harlan to Rowoldt v. Perfetto. Harlan wrote, “I regret my 
inability to join the Court’s opinion, for its effort to find a way out from 
the rigors of a severe statute has alluring appeal. The difficulty is that in 
order to reach its result the Court has had to take impermissible liberties 
with the statute.”131 He paints a picture of a man who clearly knew he was 
a party member.132 While Justice Harlan acknowledges the “severe 
consequences,” and suggests that a Fifth Amendment Due Process 
argument might have been persuasive, he found that as a statutory matter, 
the Court had invented a result the statute did not permit.133 
Professor Frickey has suggested that this, and other Warren-era 
jurisprudence, emerged in response to the excesses of the McCarthy era: 
These 1950s progenitors arose in a time of political hysteria about 
Communism that threatened to drag the Court, already vulnerable 
because of southern opposition to Brown, into a maelstrom of 
congressional reprisals that would have not merely overturned 
cases, but would have entrenched disturbing values into the public 
law and institutionally wounded the Court. By generally deciding 
these cases at the subconstitutional level through the rules of 
avoidance, the Court used techniques that might defuse political 
 
 128. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 522 (1954). Important dissents in the 1940s and 1950s also 
showed discomfort with the way that the executive branch was denying entry to suspected 
Communists. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 550 (1950) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224 (1953) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting) (“Indeed, if put to the choice, one might well prefer to live under Soviet substantive law 
applied in good faith by our common-law procedures than under our substantive law enforced by 
Soviet procedural practices.”). 
 129. Galvan, 347 U.S. at 527 (“Congress could not have intended to authorize the wholesale 
deportation of aliens who, accidentally, artificially, or unconsciously in appearance only, are found to 
be members of or affiliated with an organization of whose platform and purposes they have no real 
knowledge.” (quoting 97 Cong. Rec. 2373)). The Court found the statute to be constitutional. Id. at 
532.  
 130. 355 U.S. at 115. 
 131. Id. at 121 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 132. Id. at 125 (“The petitioner has freely admitted that he was a member of the Party for about 
a year; that he paid Party dues; that he attended Party meetings; and that he worked, without pay, in 
the Party bookstore, which he recognized as ‘an official outlet for communist literature.’ Beyond this, 
petitioner’s testimony betrayed considerable, albeit rudimentary, knowledge of Communist history 
and philosophy.”). 
 133. Id. at 126. 
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opposition while incrementally adjusting public law to better 
respect individual liberty.134 
While Professor Frickey does not include the Rowaldt case in his 
analysis, it certainly fits the argument. Notably, in Galvan, the majority 
questioned the wisdom of the statute, even while finding it 
constitutional.135 And Justice Harlan’s dissent in Rowoldt makes clear his 
view that the Court is trying to work around an ill-advised statute.136 
Regardless of the reasons, the leniency continues today, as illustrated 
famously by permitting First Lady Melania Trump’s Communist Party-
member parents to migrate as lawful permanent residents to the United 
States in 2018.137 
4. Duress via Waiver: Terrorism-Related Inadmissibility Grounds 
While the duress defense in crime-related removal cases emerges as 
an issue litigated (in most cases) before the individual faces removal as an 
additional consequence, the defense exists as an explicit exception for 
cases related to the so-called terrorism bars. Furthermore, this defense 
exists both as grounds of inadmissibility (the “Terrorism-Related 
Inadmissibility Grounds” or “TRIG” bar)138 and deportability (an identical 
provision, applied to those who had been previously lawfully admitted 
whom the government is now seeking to deport).139 
The terrorism bars are purposefully broad and cover a wide range  
of actions defined statutorily as “terrorist activity.”140 The statute also 
separately defines what it means to “engage in terrorist activity” and  
states material support as one of the prohibited activities, including  
“a safe house, transportation, communications, funds . . . or other material 
financial benefit, false documentation or identification, weapons 
(including chemical, biological, or radiological weapons), explosives,  
or training.”141 As a result, the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board)  
 
 134. Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal 
Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 CALIF. L. 
REV. 397, 401 (2005). 
 135. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 528 (1954) (“A fair reading of the legislation requires that 
this scope be given to what Congress enacted in 1950, however severe the consequences and whatever 
view one may have of the wisdom of the means which Congress employed to meet its desired end.”).  
 136. Rowoldt, 355 U.S. at 121 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 137. Glenn Kessler, What’s the Immigration Status of Melania Trump’s Parents?, WASH. POST 
(Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2018/02/13/whats-the-
immigration-status-of-melania-trumps-parents/?hpid=hp_rhp-more-top-stories_factchecker-
325am:homepage/story [https://perma.cc/86YB-P7VY]. 
 138. INA § 212(a)(3); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3). 
 139. INA § 237(a)(4); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4). 
 140. INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii). 
 141. INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI). 
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has determined that even de minimis material support, like cooking  
and cleaning clothes for terrorists, justifies application of this ground  
of inadmissibility.142 
Despite the likelihood that this broad interpretation could lead to 
harsh results, the Board, in 2016’s Matter of M-H-Z-, rejected the idea that 
there is an implicit duress exception to any such activity. Matter of  
M-H-Z- considered the situation of a Colombian woman who provided 
food and merchandise from her store under threat from the Revolutionary 
Armed Forced of Colombia (FARC).143 After reviewing federal court 
cases that had declined to find such an exception, the Board reasoned 
against an implied duress exception in two ways. First, a different part of 
the grounds of inadmissibility (in regard to membership in a totalitarian or 
Communist Party) did include a duress exception, and the Board reasoned 
that “[i]f Congress intended to make involuntariness or duress an 
exception for aliens who provided material support to a terrorist 
organization, it would reasonably be expected to have enacted a provision 
similar to that in [the totalitarian and communist provision] of the Act.”144 
Second, the Board relied on the creation of a discretionary waiver of 
TRIG, “for deserving aliens to avoid the consequences of the bar.”145 
Specifically, the Board reasoned that “the inclusion of the waiver was a 
means of balancing the harsh provisions of the material support bar and an 
indication that Congress’s omission of ameliorative provisions in section 
212(a)(3)(B) of the Act was intentional.”146 In other words, the waiver 
theoretically functions hand in hand with the harshness and breadth of the 
inadmissibility ground. 
To understand the flexibility that exists in the context of terrorism 
(and which is as yet lacking in the presumably more sympathetic asylum 
context), it is important to examine how this waiver authority is exercised. 
Within the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS) has authority to grant waivers for material 
support provided to Tier III terrorist organizations,147 and it may do so 
either for situational reasons or for entire groups. Between 2006 and 
September 2016, USCIS had granted 22,000 such waivers.148 The 
 
 142. Matter of A-C-M-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 303 (B.I.A. 2018). See generally John Flud, Duress and 
the Material Support Bar in Asylum Law: Finding Equity in the Face of Harsh Results, 59 S. TEX. L. 
REV. 537 (2018) (examining the purpose for the bar, and the ways in which the procedure is flawed 
and leaves the waivers out of reach of many applicants). 
 143. Matter of M-H-Z-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 757 (B.I.A. 2016). 
 144. Id. at 761. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 762 (citing Matter of S-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 936, 941 (B.I.A. 2006)). 
 147. Defined at I.N.A. § 212(a)(3)(B)(vi); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi). 
 148. Mica Rosenberg & Yeganeh Torbati, Trump Administration May Change Rules that Allow 
Terror Victims to Immigrate to U.S., REUTERS (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
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situational reasons focus on duress,149 which USCIS guidance defines 
through a multi-factor analysis that largely tracks the definitions of duress 
in domestic and international criminal law and in international refugee 
law.150 The factors include whether someone “reasonably could have 
avoided, or took steps to avoid” the action; the severity, imminence, and 
likelihood of harm that was threatened; and how direct the threat was (was 
it to the applicant, their family, or the community more generally).151 
USCIS has also designated approximately twenty groups as being exempt 
from these bars, ranging from the Oromo Liberation Front of Ethiopia to 
the Iraqi National Congress (INC), Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).152 
In immigration law, as in other areas of law, exceptions are more 
powerful than waivers for at least two reasons. First, they remove someone 
from the purview of a rule—the rule exists but does not apply to people 
covered by an exception. Second, they work automatically—if they are not 
included in the general rule, they do not need to engage in extra procedures 
to justify themselves. That second difference matters profoundly to the 
TRIG analysis because, while the duress waiver exists in the law, it is 
granted only as a matter of discretion and individual grants are limited.153 
As Judge Droney wrote in a concurrence to Hernandez v. Sessions: 
[T]he facts of this case, the nature of the discretionary waiver 
process, and the limited public information available regarding the 
waiver prevent me from concluding that the waiver system 
necessarily complies with the Protocol; indeed, these issues leave 




 149. Interoffice Memorandum from Jonathan Scharfen, Deputy Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. 
Servs., to Assoc. Dirs. and Chief Couns., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., and Chief, Off. of Admin. 
Appeals, Processing the Discretionary Exemption to the Inadmissibility Ground for Providing 
Material Support to Certain Terrorists (May 24, 2007) [hereinafter USCIS Interoffice Memorandum], 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/pressrelease/MaterialSupport_24May07.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/D25D-S33B]. 
 150. See id. §§ I(B), (C). 
 151. USCIS Interoffice Memorandum, supra note 149, at 5. 
 152. Terrorism-Related Inadmissibility Grounds—Exemptions, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. 
SERVS. (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.uscis.gov/laws-and-policy/other-resources/terrorism-related-
inadmissibility-grounds-trig/terrorism-related-inadmissibility-grounds-exemptions [https://perma.cc/ 
RCJ3-4EZ3]. 
 153. As of 2015, the total number of grants given since the program’s inception was 
approximately 6,300 (USCIS did not provide data on how many were requested, so there is no 
percentage approval rate available). USCIS Provides TRIG Statistics from 8/13/15 Meeting, AM. 
IMMIGR. LAW. ASS’N, https://www.aila.org/infonet/uscis-trig-statistics-from-08-13-15-meeting 
[https://perma.cc/JP3G-ND52]. 
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system does not comply with our treaty obligations and 
Congress’s intent to create an effective waiver system.154 
Nonetheless, at least in theory, a waiver does exist for those swept 
under the broad terrorism bars—a waiver that does not exist in the contexts 
that follow. 
5. Duress Debated: Denaturalization 
Much of the remaining contest over the role of duress in immigration 
law stems from the legacy of Fedorenko v. United States.155 Fedorenko 
was an armed guard at the Treblinka Death Camp in Poland who came to 
the United States as a refugee under the Displaced Persons Act (DPA).156 
At that time, he failed to disclose his time at the Treblinka Camp.157  
He later became a U.S. citizen, but when his work at Treblinka came to 
light, the U.S. Government commenced denaturalization proceedings 
because he had assisted the enemy in civilian persecutions, and under 
section 2(a) of the DPA, he was ineligible to naturalize.158 In these 
proceedings, Fedorenko admitted to his work at Treblinka and further 
admitted to shooting at escaping inmates.159 But he claimed that his service 
as a guard was coerced (the factual record on the level of coercion is 
mixed, at best).160 
The Supreme Court upheld the denaturalization and dismissed the 
availability of a duress defense.161 The Court interpreted the DPA to reach 
its conclusion that Congress had not meant to distinguish between 
voluntary and involuntary assistance.162 In Fedorenko, the Court did not 
hold that duress never mattered. Instead, it compared two side-by-side 
provisions of the DPA to show that one omitted the word “voluntarily” 
and the other used it. The Court writes: 
Congress was perfectly capable of adopting a “voluntariness” 
limitation where it felt that one was necessary is plain from 
comparing § 2(a) with § 2(b), which excludes only those 
 
 154. Hernandez v. Sessions, 884 F.3d 107, 115 (2d Cir. 2018) (Droney, J., concurring). 
 155. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981). The Court, in Negusie v. Holder, 555 
U.S. 514 (2009), declined to extend the holding in Fedorenko. 
 156. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 494–96; Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 
Stat. 1009 (1948). 
 157. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 496. 
 158. Id. at 497–98; Pub. L. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948). 
 159. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512 n.34. 
 160. Id. at 496. 
 161. Id. at 518. 
 162. Id. at 512 (“Under traditional principles of statutory construction, the deliberate omission 
of the word ‘voluntary’ from § 2(a) compels the conclusion that the statute made all those who assisted 
in the persecution of civilians ineligible for visas.”). 
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individuals who “voluntarily assisted the enemy forces . . . in their 
operations . . . .” Under traditional principles of statutory 
construction, the deliberate omission of the word “voluntary” 
from § 2(a) compels the conclusion that the statute made all those 
who assisted in the persecution of civilians ineligible for visas.163 
This decision has received criticism on its own merits as a 
philosophical matter concerning moral responsibility. Shortly after the 
decision was issued, lawyer Abbe Dienstag wrote that the Court “blindly 
encountered-and blithely ignored-another issue of profoundly greater 
moral consequence. The question of whether individuals are to be held 
accountable for capital crimes committed under life-threatening 
circumstances is one that has engaged legal scholars for centuries.”164 
Moreover, Professor Stephen J. Massey adds, “Rather than openly 
acknowledge that it was making a moral decision regarding the level of 
moral responsibility necessary to find that an individual has met the legal 
standard, the Court pretended that its conclusion was dictated by neutral 
arguments of statutory construction.”165 
Dienstag notes how this marked a dramatic divergence from prior 
denaturalization (or “expatriation” law) where voluntariness had always 
been a factor.166 Perhaps the Court itself recognized this implicitly, in  
oft-quoted footnote 34,167 where it emphasized the need to focus “on 
whether particular conduct can be considered assisting in the persecution 
of civilians.”168 The Court immediately continues with this particularized 
analysis of Fedorenko’s culpability, comparing him (unfavorably) to 
someone whose conduct was much less grave: 
Thus, an individual who did no more than cut the hair of female 
inmates before they were executed cannot be found to have 
assisted in the persecution of civilians. On the other hand, there 
can be no question that a guard who was issued a uniform and 
armed with a rifle and a pistol, who was paid a stipend and was 
regularly allowed to leave the concentration camp to visit a nearby 
village, and who admitted to shooting at escaping inmates on 
 
 163. Id. 
 164. Abbe L. Dienstag, Fedorenko v. United States: War Crimes, the Defense of Duress, and 
American Nationality Law, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 120, 130–31 (1982) (“The issue remains unsettled 
though the weight of contemporary scholarship accords considerable sympathy to the accused in such 
circumstances.”). 
 165. Massey, supra note 32, at 116. 
 166. Dienstag, supra note 164, at 134 n.49 (“Before Afroyim, the Supreme Court had long held 
that in order to result in loss of citizenship the statutorily prescribed expatriating acts had to be 
voluntarily performed.”). 
 167. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512 n.34. 
 168. Id.; see also Laufer, supra note 29, at 456–67; Petkiewytsch v. INS, 945 F.2d 871, 880 (6th 
Cir. 1991) (emphasizing the need for particularized analysis of conduct). 
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orders from the commandant of the camp, fits within the statutory 
language about persons who assisted in the persecution of 
civilians. Other cases may present more difficult line-drawing 
problems, but we need decide only this case.169 
Once the BIA began applying the Fedorenko decision, the import of 
this footnote faded, and the emphasis on case-by-case line drawing was 
replaced with “a form of strict liability” in the assessment of Professor 
Kate Evans.170 In Matter of Laipenieks, the Government was seeking to 
deport a Latvian man who had joined the Nazis in 1941 to help identify 
Communists in Communist-occupied Latvia.171 He interrogated suspected 
Communists, and did not otherwise harm them, but he did know the 
interrogations resulted in persecution for some of those identified as 
Communists.172 “[The BIA] crafted a rule,” writes Evans, “that looks only 
to the ‘objective effects’ of an individual’s actions, not his intent, level of 
participation, ability to avoid harming others, nor even his knowledge of 
the effect of his actions.”173 
In her view, this strict liability is all the worse because her research 
casts doubt on the correctness of Fedorenko as a historical matter.174 
Professor Evans also shows that international legal history favors reading 
a duress exception into the persecutor bar, even in the context of the DPA 
and the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization (IRO) 
whose provisions were adopted “wholesale” in the DPA.175 Specifically, 
she explores the history of the provision and explains why one provision 
references voluntariness, and not the other—simply put, voluntariness was 
already presumed to be part of the meaning of “persecution,” but it needed 
forceful articulation in the conscription context because the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Bloc wanted recruits to be exempted from protection, that they 
might be repatriated back to the Eastern Bloc: 
Over the objections of the Eastern bloc countries, the word 
“voluntarily” was used to ensure that conscripted soldiers and 
prisoners of war would not be forced to return to their home 
countries if they had political objections to the governments in 
place after the war. In contrast, the term “persecution” had already 
acquired a common meaning from its use in prior refugee 
documents. The isolated use of the term “voluntarily” does not 
reflect a policy choice to exclude all who assisted in the 
 
 169. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512 n.34. 
 170. Kate Evans, Drawing Lines Among the Persecuted, 101 MINN. L. REV. 453, 470–73 (2016). 
 171. Matter of Laipenieks, 18 I. & N. Dec. 433 (B.I.A. 1983). 
 172. Id. at 451–52. 
 173. Evans, supra note 170, at 470 (quoting Laipenieks, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 433). 
 174. Id. at 478–86. 
 175. Id. at 477. 
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persecution of others from IRO coverage, regardless of 
circumstance, because the term “persecution” already required 
deliberate, intentional, and direct action.176 
Moreover, in implementation of the IRO, the persecutor exclusion 
did not apply to any person who claimed they were a victim of Nazis or 
other fascist regimes.177 She concludes that “evidence of individual 
innocence in the actions of the group was a defense and victims were not 
considered persecutors. Consequently, the bar applied only to individuals 
who took specific and direct action to cause the persecution of others or to 
benefit from it.”178 
Why does this World War II era statute, interpreted in the context of 
a 1981 denaturalization case, matter? Because the Government invokes 
Fedorenko as dispositive in the context of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act.179 When a decision is based upon statutory interpretation, it is 
necessarily limited to the statute in question. The Government’s sweeping 
embrace of Fedorenko in relation to the INA is simply wrong, as the 
Supreme Court eventually made clear in Negusie v. Holder, discussed in 
the following section.180 
B. Duress Unresolved: Bars to Asylum 
1. Infirmities of Administrative Common Law in Immigration 
Before turning to the current unresolved issues in asylum law, it is 
vital to understand some unusual features of how administrative common 
law is created in the immigration law context.181 Immigration judges, who 
form the first line of interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
and accompanying regulations, are administrative law judges within the 
Department of Justice (DOJ), and they serve at the pleasure of the Attorney 
General.182 The appeals body, the BIA, likewise sits within DOJ and is 
 
 176. Id. at 486. 
 177. Id. at 499. 
 178. Id. at 510. 
 179. Matter of Negusie, 28 I. & N. Dec. 120 (A.G. 2020); Brief for the Respondent at *8–10, 
Negusie v. Mukasey, 552 U.S. 1255 (2008) (No. 07-499). 
 180. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 520 (2009). 
 181. The phenomenon of “administrative common law” has been well explored in the 
scholarship. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. 
REV. 113 (1998); Henry J. Friendly, Book Review, Administrative Law Treatise (2d ed. Volumes 1 & 
2). By Kenneth Culp Davis, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 471 (1980). 
 182. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (“The term ‘immigration judge’ means an attorney whom the 
Attorney General appoints as an administrative judge within the Executive Office for Immigration 
Review, qualified to conduct specified classes of proceedings, including a hearing under section 1229a 
of this title. An immigration judge shall be subject to such supervision and shall perform such duties 
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frequently the last court to review a decision.183 The vulnerability to 
politicization shared by the immigration judge corps and the BIA is well 
understood; scandals erupted during the George W. Bush 
Administration184 and are simmering in 2020 as well.185 Writing on the 
politicization of this administrative law agency, Professor Maureen 
Sweeney adds that: 
Sessions was not subtle in reminding judges and Board Members 
that they served at his pleasure and were expected to implement 
his decisions. In his certified decisions, he explicitly emphasized 
the “extraordinary and pervasive role” that the Attorney General 
has over immigration matters as “virtually unique” and the power 
accorded him as “an unfettered grant of authority” including 
“broad powers.”186 
But even more critical for this issue is the unusual regulatory power 
the Attorney General has to refer BIA decisions to him or herself.187 
Should there be a decision from the BIA that the Attorney General 
disagrees with, they may refer the case from the BIA to themselves for a 
different result (or to offer different reasoning). This power is well-
settled,188 and has found a strong advocate in the Administrative 
 
as the Attorney General shall prescribe, but shall not be employed by the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service.”). 
 183. This is partly because Congress narrowed the right to appeal to federal circuit courts in 
1996, but it is also for at least two other reasons. First, there is no guarantee of a stay of removal during 
the federal appellate process. Second, circuit court litigation is expensive and beyond the financial 
abilities of many immigrants. 
 184. DOJ led an investigation into the politicized hiring practices done by, among others, Monica 
Goodling. U.S. DEP’T JUST., AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING BY 
MONICA GOODLING AND OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 1 (2008), 
https://www.justice.gov/opr/page/file/1206586/download [https://perma.cc/HE4S-CJYH]. 
 185. See Joel Rose, Senate Democrats Accuse Justice Department of Politicizing Immigration 
Courts, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/02/13/805657208/senate-
democrats-accuse-justice-department-of-politicizing-immigration-courts [https://perma.cc/TBT6-
JQQX]; Lorelei Laird, Whose Court Is This Anyway? Immigration Judges Accuse Executive Branch 
of Politicizing Their Courts, AM. BAR ASS’N J. (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.abajournal.com/ 
magazine/article/immigration-judges-executive-politicizing-courts [https://perma.cc/HC8E-GQKH]. 
 186. Maureen A. Sweeney, Enforcing/Protection: The Danger of Chevron in Refugee Act Cases, 
71 ADMIN. L. REV. 127, 141 (2019) (quoting Attorney General Sessions opinion in Matter of A-B-, 27 
I. & N. Dec. 316, 323–24 (A.G. 2018)). 
 187. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i) (2020) (“The Board shall refer to the Attorney General for review 
of its decision all cases that: (i) The Attorney General directs the Board to refer to him.”). 
 188. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the Limits 
to Consistency, 60 STAN. L. REV. 413, 458 (2007).  
Among the strongest defenses of agency head review were the 1992 Administrative 
Conference recommendations on the federal administrative judiciary and the 
comprehensive consultants’ report on which they were based. Both documents repeatedly 
extolled the benefits of agency head review, portraying it as a way for agency heads to 
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Conference of the United States.189 Professor Margaret Taylor describes 
how the power conflicts with a familiar “core value of our legal system: 
that disputes are resolved by an impartial adjudicator who has no interest 
in the outcome.”190 Professor Taylor notes, however, that “[a]djudication 
within executive branch agencies has long been a controversial exception 
to this model.”191 In particular, Professor Legomsky, later General Counsel 
to USCIS during the Obama Administration, has criticized the practice, 
stating that it “entails the substitution of one person’s judgment for the 
collective judgment of several adjudicators. And the probability that a 
strong ideological bias will influence the result is greater when one person 
is deciding.”192 Professor Legomsky prefers the restraint of rule-making to 
the case-by-case power that referral permits, undermining the 
independence of the immigration judges.193 More recently, Professor 
Sweeney has pointed to this process as one of many reasons why such 
decisions should receive extremely limited, if any, deference under 
Chevron.194 She describes how, “as the head of the Justice Department, the 
Attorney General has considerable power to influence the immigration 
court system in a number of strikingly direct ways, from the bureaucratic 
to the jurisprudential.”195 Professor Richard Frankel likewise takes issue 
with the application of Chevron deference to such decisions, writing that 
“Chevron deference should not apply because none of the three primary 
justifications for Chevron deference—procedural formality, specialized 
expertise, or democratic accountability—are present in Attorney General 
immigration decisions.”196 
 
assure inter-decisional consistency and to maintain control over basic policy at the same 
time. 
Id. 
 189. Recommendations and Statements of the Administrative Conference, 57 Fed. Reg. 61,759 
(Dec. 29, 1992) (codified at 1 C.F.R. pts. 305, 310). However, that same document also states the 
importance of independent administrative law judges: “The need for impartial factfinders in 
administrative adjudications is evident. To ensure the acceptability of the process, some degree of 
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61,760. 
 190. Margaret H. Taylor, Midnight Agency Adjudication: Attorney General Review of Board of 
Immigration Appeals Decisions, 102 IOWA L. REV. ONLINE 18, 19 (2016). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Legomsky, supra note 188, at 461. 
 193. “These arguments are not generically compelling, however, and they seem especially 
vulnerable in the asylum context. Inter-decisional consistency, while important for all the reasons 
acknowledged in Part II of this Article, does not require the agency head’s intrusion into the 
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 194. See Sweeney, supra note 186, at 136–46. 
 195. Id. at 138. 
 196. Richard Frankel, Deporting Chevron: Why the Attorney General’s Immigration Decisions 
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This power, which has been used at an unusually high rate during the 
Trump Administration,197 is the reason for the current instability in the 
state of the duress doctrine in asylum law, as the next section illustrates. 
2. The Persecutor Bar: The Negusie Cases 
The Refugee Convention198 and subsequent Protocol199 prohibit 
states from returning people to countries where they face a well-founded 
fear of persecution. This obligation, known as nonrefoulement, is a 
minimal obligation and manifests in U.S. law as “withholding of 
removal”: a promise of non-deportation, and nothing more.200 Asylum is a 
more preferential status, as it places individuals on a path toward 
citizenship which is more than the Refugee Convention requires. Because 
it goes beyond the Convention’s minimum requirements, asylum status is 
subject to certain limits and bars.201 It is discretionary relief,202 which 
means that criminal convictions typically disqualify people from asylum; 
applicants must apply for it within their first year in the United States; and 
the law bars asylum for people who have committed serious nonpolitical 
crimes or who have been persecutors of others.203 These last two bars to 
asylum are also bars to withholding of removal; unfortunately, this is 
where the availability of duress is utterly unresolved. 
The Supreme Court took up this issue in Negusie v. Holder in 
2009.204 Mr. Negusie, an Eritrean man, had been denied both asylum and 
withholding of removal because of the persecutor bar. Negusie had been 
 
 197. As of October 2019, not quite three years into one term, Attorneys General certified cases 
to themselves nine times (Sessions four times, and Barr five). By contrast, in two terms, the Bush 
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Administration three times. Adiel Kaplan, AG Barr Issues 2 Decisions Limiting Ways Immigrants Can 
Fight Deportation, NBC (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/ag-barr-
issues-2-decisions-limiting-ways-immigrants-can-fight-n1073026 [https://perma.cc/RSR7-BS92]. 
 198. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 33, ¶ 1, July 28, 1951, 
189 U.N.T.S. 137. 
 199. United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1, ¶ 1, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 
U.N.T.S. 267. 
 200. INA § 241(b)(3); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(b)(3)(A)–(E). For a comparison of asylum and 
withholding of removal, see generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FACT SHEET: ASYLUM AND 
WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL RELIEF CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE PROTECTIONS (2009), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2009/01/23/AsylumWithholdingCATProtectio
ns.pdf [https://perma.cc/YW4H-NPTB]. 
 201. INA § 208(a)(2); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2). 
 202. INA § 208(b)(1)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (“The Secretary of Homeland Security or 
the Attorney General may grant asylum . . . .” (emphasis added)); cf. INA § 241(b)(3); 
8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (“Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), the Attorney General may not 
remove an alien . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 203. INA §§ 208(a)(2)(B), (b)(2)(A)(ii), (b)(2)(A)(iii); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a)(2)(B), (b)(2)(A)(ii), 
(b)(2)(A)(iii). 
 204. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009). 
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incarcerated and tortured by the Eritrean Government, and when released 
after two years, they forced him to work for four years as a prison guard: 
It is undisputed that the prisoners he guarded were being 
persecuted on account of a protected ground—i.e., “race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion.” [Negusie] testified that he carried a gun, guarded the 
gate to prevent escape, and kept prisoners from taking showers 
and obtaining fresh air. He also guarded prisoners to make sure 
they stayed in the sun, which he knew was a form of punishment. 
He saw at least one man die after being in the sun for more than 
two hours. [Negusie] testified that he had not shot at or directly 
punished any prisoner and that he helped prisoners on various 
occasions.205 
In upholding the denial of asylum and withholding of removal, the 
Board of Immigration Appeals relied upon the Fedorenko decision.206 The 
Court questioned this reliance, noting that Fedorenko addressed “a 
different statute enacted for a different purpose”207 and contrasted the DPA 
at issue in Fedorenko with the Refugee Act.208 First, the Court looked at 
the statutory language and found that unlike the DPA, this bar does not 
mention voluntariness anywhere, so the statutory interpretation must 
necessarily be different.209 Second, the Court contrasted the contexts and 
purpose of the two laws: 
Congress enacted the DPA in 1948 as part of an international 
effort to address individuals who were forced to leave their 
homelands during and after the Second World War. The DPA 
excludes those who “voluntarily assisted the enemy forces since 
the outbreak of the second world war,” as well as all who “assisted 
the enemy in persecuting civil populations of countries.” The 
latter exclusion clause makes no reference to culpability . . . . The 
persecutor bar in this case, by contrast, was enacted as part of the 
Refugee Act of 1980. Unlike the DPA, which was enacted to 
address not just the postwar refugee problem but also the 
Holocaust and its horror, the Refugee Act was designed to provide 
a general rule for the ongoing treatment of all refugees and 
displaced persons.210 
 
 205. Id. at 515 (internal citations omitted). 
 206. Id. at 514. 
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 208. Id. at 522–23. 
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The Court held that Fedorenko did not control interpretation of the 
persecutor bar in the Refugee Act: “The BIA is not bound to apply the 
Fedorenko rule that motive and intent are irrelevant to the persecutor bar 
at issue in this case. Whether the statute permits such an interpretation 
based on a different course of reasoning must be determined in the first 
instance by the agency.”211 
Applying Chevron deference, the Court remanded the case to the 
BIA to do the required statutory interpretation.212 Nine years later, the BIA 
issued its decision in Matter of Negusie.213 The BIA found that the implicit 
duress exception is a permissible and desirable reading of the statute: 
Recognizing a narrow duress exception is reasonable because it 
fulfills the purposes of the persecutor bar and the overall purposes 
of the Refugee Act. A narrow duress exception is also consistent 
with the purposes and implementation of the Convention and 
Protocol. And it is the best of the permissible approaches.214 
In reaching this decision, the BIA applied the statutory interpretation 
requested by the Supreme Court and gave particular weight to the 
observation “that Congress enacted the Refugee Act to bring United States 
law into conformity with the Convention and the Protocol.”215 After going 
through extensive legislative history, the BIA also recognized “that 
Congress intended that the persecutor bar be interpreted in a way that not 
only comports with our obligations under Article 1F(a) of the Convention 
but also reflects the international understanding of those obligations.”216 
The BIA adopted a five-element test for the existence of duress that 
an applicant needs to show by a preponderance of the evidence: 
[T]hat he (1) acted under an imminent threat of death or serious 
bodily injury to himself or others; (2) reasonably believed that the 
threatened harm would be carried out unless he acted or refrained 
from acting; (3) had no reasonable opportunity to escape or 
otherwise frustrate the threat; (4) did not place himself in a 
situation in which he knew or reasonably should have known that 
he would likely be forced to act or refrain from acting; and (5) 
knew or reasonably should have known that the harm he inflicted 
was not greater than the threatened harm to himself or others. Only 
if the applicant establishes each element by a preponderance of 
 
 211. Id. at 522–23. 
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the evidence would it be appropriate to consider whether the 
duress defense applies.217 
This definition adheres closely to the versions established 
internationally and in domestic criminal law, described in Part I. The only 
addition here is the fourth element—the “assumption of the risk” principle 
that some, but not all, U.S. circuits have adopted in the criminal setting.218 
Within the predictable range of duress definitions, it is at the narrower, 
more restrictive end of those definitions but well within the range. 
Shortly after the BIA issued its thoughtful decision, then-Attorney 
General Sessions certified Negusie to himself in Matter of Negusie. As 
expected, when the next Attorney General finally issued his decision in 
2020, it reversed the Board, spinning an alternative interpretation wherein 
statutes (like the DPA at issue in Fedorenko) play a far more compelling 
role than international law.219 Future litigation is all but assured if this 
Attorney General opinion endures past the Trump Administration. 
3. Expanding Negusie to the Serious Nonpolitical Crimes Bar 
The bar to asylum for those who have committed serious nonpolitical 
crimes is distinct, of course, from the persecutor bar. Nonetheless, because 
it exists within the same part of the same law (the Refugee Act of 1980), 
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Negusie must apply equally—i.e., 
whether duress is a permissible consideration for this bar must be 
addressed as a matter of statutory interpretation of this particular statute.220 
As with the BIA’s decision in the remanded Negusie case, there are strong 
grounds to argue that the statute does permit an implied duress 
exception.221 
These arguments benefit substantially from the traditional reliance 
upon international law that is a core aspect of asylum jurisprudence in the 
United States. Under the foundational Schooner Charming Betsy code of 
statutory interpretation, formulated by Chief Justice John Marshall, “an act 
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Massey, supra note 32, at 136. 
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of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if 
any other possible construction remains.”222 Equally importantly, 
Congress explicitly understood the Refugee Act of 1980 as comporting 
with treaty obligations under the U.N. Refugee Convention, and the United 
Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.223 The BIA has 
recognized this as well,224 while it is equally true that the influence is at 
the persuasive and not binding level.225 As a result, U.S. refugee and 
asylum case law is replete with examples of reliance upon international 
interpretations of issues relating to the Refugee Convention and Refugee 
Protocol, including the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for 
Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (UNHCR Handbook).226 In his 
decision in the certified Negusie decision, Attorney General Barr 
emphasizes the non-binding nature of such guidance, noting that “our 
international agreements do not compel” particular interpretations,227 but 
his view of how persuasive such agreements are is far from unanimous. 
In one of the few cases to consider the serious nonpolitical crimes 
bar, the Ninth Circuit stated that “[s]ince the only clear signal that can be 
gleaned from the legislative history is that Congress intended the 
nonpolitical crimes exception to withholding of deportation to be 
consistent with the Convention and Protocol, we must look first to those 
documents for guidance.”228 And the BIA itself noted in the Negusie 
remand that“[c]ertain provisions of the Act obviously correspond to those 
in the Convention because the language is the same. For example, the 
‘serious nonpolitical crime’ provisions of sections 208(b)(2)(A)(iii) and 
241(b)(3)(B)(iii) of the Act correspond to Article 1F(b) of the 
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Convention.”229 The BIA in Negusie continued by writing that “Congress 
intended that the persecutor bar be interpreted in a way that not only 
comports with [its] obligations under Article 1F(a) of the Convention but 
also reflects the international understanding of those obligations.”230  
As established in Part I.C, international refugee law resoundingly 
recognizes the duress defense with only modest variations in the 
limitations of the defense. 
The clear existence of a duress defense in related contexts perhaps 
explains the unstated analysis that has occurred around the serious 
nonpolitical crimes bar to date. The Sixth Circuit acknowledged a possible 
duress defense, although it declined to apply it in the case itself.  
Urbina-Mejia v. Holder concerns a young Honduran man who joined a 
gang after they beat him severely.231 As a gang member, he engaged in 
extortion for the gang, which the immigration judge found to be a serious 
nonpolitical crime, despite his claims of coercion. The BIA did consider 
the claim of duress but agreed with the Immigration Judge who said he 
had a “fair amount of autonomy,”232 making the duress argument 
unpersuasive. The Sixth Circuit upheld that finding.233 As Professor 
Marouf observes, “While Urbina-Mejia shows that the BIA and Sixth 
Circuit were willing to consider an argument resembling a common law 
duress defense, the decision makes no reference to the elements for 
establishing duress and never mentions the common law.”234  
Nonetheless, while it was a very light treatment of the defense, there 
appears to have been shared agreement from the immigration judge level 
up to the circuit court that the duress defense could exist, even if it failed 
here as a factual matter. 
The BIA also opened the door to a possible duress defense in  
Matter of E-A-, again finding it inapplicable factually to the case before it. 
Specifically, in E-A-, the applicant’s fears of harm were too speculative 
for the defense to be persuasive: his “generalized fear is not sufficient to 
show that he would have suffered any dire consequences.”235 While not 
tying this analysis to a specific standard, the BIA was invoking two 
elements of the widely accepted duress doctrine: that there be imminent 
harm and that the consequences be akin to “an unlawful threat of imminent 
death or serious bodily injury.”236 
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To the extent that duress is recognized in immigration case law, the 
duress defense occurs at the third level of analysis—after other legal 
findings are made. The first level is whether the crime rises to the level of 
atrociousness needed to qualify as a serious nonpolitical crime.237  
In INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, the Supreme Court supported the BIA’s test, 
which balances the political aspects of a crime and its “common-law 
character,”238 inquires about disproportionality between the two, and 
“whether the acts are atrocious.”239 This focus on atrociousness, as 
opposed to mere criminality, resonates with the seriousness that UNCHR 
has articulated: 
[Article 1F] excludes persons whose past criminal acts in another 
jurisdiction are especially egregious. The “seriousness” of a crime 
may depend on such factors as the extent of physical or property 
harm it causes, and the type of penal sentence it attracts within the 
particular legal system. Rape, homicide, armed robbery, and arson 
are examples of offences which are likely to be considered serious 
in most States.240 
In other contexts, a related argument would be that the underlying 
crime was political.241 However, this Article is concerned primarily  
with acts committed under duress, not acts committed intentionally for 
political reasons. 
The second level of analysis is whether there are “serious reasons for 
believing”242 a crime was committed. The Government has the burden to 
prove a “probable cause” exists that the asylum-seeker committed a crime, 
not that the asylum-seeker was convicted.243 The Government will 
typically meet that burden through the applicant’s own answers to the 
asylum application, which requests such information.244 The “serious 
reason” language comes directly from the Refugee Convention, and its 
intent was to ensure that asylum-seekers not be erroneously excluded from 
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Convention coverage.245 The probable cause standard marks an area of 
departure from the international standards, which are more protective.246 
It is only at the third stage of analysis that a duress analysis would 
exist—as a kind of waiver after a court finds that there are serious reasons 
to consider that the bar applies. As the next section discusses, there are 
sound reasons to consider duress in the first stage of analysis. 
III. A NEW FRAMEWORK: TOWARD A UNIFORM APPLICATION OF THE 
DURESS DOCTRINE 
This section of the Article provides a new framework for the duress 
doctrine in immigration law. It will consider two possibilities for creating 
uniformity: statutory solutions and judicial applications. The statutory 
solution would create a duress standard common to all immigration cases, 
positioning the duress analysis first in considering whether any 
immigration consequences might exist. The judicial improvement in how 
a judge’s familiarity with the elements of the five-part test for duress will 
create a more uniform application and resolution of cases. 
A. Statutory Solutions 
The creakiness of the immigration statute is a well-known,  
well-studied problem. The basic 1952 framework has absorbed, over the 
decades, concern for Civil Rights247 and asylum-seekers,248 and anxieties 
about undocumented immigrants in the workplace,249 fraud,250 crime,251 
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welfare,252 and terrorism.253 The experience of amending the INA has been 
one of subject-by-subject changes with no conceptual overhaul.254 
Beyond the incoherence that plagues the INA currently, the power of 
the Attorney General to act independently of their own Board of 
Immigration Appeals makes a more architecturally coherent law from 
Congress vital. As it is, described in Part II.B, the Attorney General has 
the unique power to resolve some of the most difficult and unsettled issues 
in immigration law at their discretion. Professors Sweeney and Frankel 
have compellingly argued that such decisions merit little or no deference 
under Chevron, and litigation of certified decisions—including the newly-
issued Negusie decision—may prove them right.255 But clear guidance 
from Congress is preferable. To properly overhaul the INA and create a 
uniform approach to immigration law, three statutory solutions are 
necessary from Congress. 
1. A Common Duress Standard 
The standard for duress elaborated in the remanded Negusie decision 
provides an excellent basis for testing how uniformity might work. That 
five-part test fits well within the bounds of tests used in domestic criminal 
law256 and in international refugee law.257 While the five-factor test forms 
a relatively narrow understanding of the duress doctrine, the test is well 
within the bounds of what jurisprudence across diverse fields has 
developed. The standard would give adjudicators the ability to make case-
by-case determinations about everything from trafficking to terrorism, 
with clear guideposts, but with flexibility to avoid absurd results. 
Returning to the introduction’s story, would Ana meet the Negusie 
test for duress? For the first element, she acted under an imminent threat 
of serious bodily injury to herself. For the second element, she reasonably 
believed that threat would be carried out, because it had been carried out 
before. She had no reasonable opportunity to escape, and her past attempts 
at escape had failed, meeting the third element. She knew that carrying 
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drugs was not a greater harm than the harm she herself would experience, 
which meets the fifth element. 
The fourth element, “assumption of the risk,” places this test on the 
narrower end of the duress doctrine, which is more challenging, and needs 
more facts than were given in the introduction. Did Ana place herself in a 
“situation in which [s]he knew or reasonably should have known that [s]he 
would likely be forced to act?”258 In the real case upon which Ana’s is 
based, she was very young when she first turned to the man who became 
her abuser, and she did not know what she would have to do until years 
into the experience. There is also room to argue that she did not so much 
“place herself” as go to the only place she had to go once her family kicked 
her out of the family home. Such a determination is highly contextual, but 
as shown in the following section, is well within judges’ fact-finding 
abilities. Ana thus might also meet even this narrower definition. 
With that duress standard met, Ana could be eligible to apply for a T 
visa, could qualify for the exception to the totalitarian party ground of 
inadmissibility, and could plausibly seek a waiver under the material 
support for terrorism ground. With a duress exception enshrined in asylum 
law, Ana, and others like her, could qualify for asylum or, if failing as a 
matter of discretion, could qualify for withholding of removal. However, 
for the duress test to truly improve the INA, whether duress occurred must 
be determined before analysis of whether a crime occurred. 
2. Requiring that Duress Be Determined First 
Clarifying the duress standard only goes so far toward improving the 
existing incoherence with INA. Because duress is, at its heart, an analysis 
of culpability, it must be part of any initial analysis of whether the ground 
of inadmissibility, deportability, or bar to asylum applies at all.  
The criminal legal system shows this well. In criminal law, the existence 
of duress affects whether conduct is considered criminal in the first 
place—it is a preliminary question that affects what charges may be 
brought and what verdicts might be sustained. The doctrine does not 
question the existence of undesirable conduct, but it determines the legal 
significance of that conduct. As Part I.B showed, if a person kills another 
while under duress, the charge drops from murder to manslaughter. For 
lesser crimes, duress may negate required mens rea making convictions 
impossible. If criminal conduct is found, duress also re-enters at the later 
stage of mitigation, meaning someone might have two opportunities to 
affect a legal outcome.259 In Ana’s story, the duress she experienced from 
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her boyfriend would likely either preclude charges being filed, or reduce 
those charges. 
This same method of analysis is necessary when considering the 
immigration, terrorism, and asylum context. Yet, for immigration law 
purposes, there are only two places that have an analogous a priori 
approach to duress. The first is in the use of the criminal legal system, 
which identifies and funnels cases into the immigration removal system.260 
If the case resolves favorably in the criminal system because of duress, 
that person may no longer be removable at all.261 The second is in the 
exception to the “membership in Communist and totalitarian parties” 
ground of inadmissibility for those whose membership was under 
duress;262 the existence of duress means that ground simply does not apply. 
No further analysis, action, or waiver is required. 
In the terrorism context, however, the law first considers whether 
someone has supplied material support for terrorists, and only secondarily 
concerns itself with duress through the discretionary waiver process.263  
If duress recognizes a lack of culpability, why could it not be an exception 
to the material support bar? The existence of an exception does not mean 
that every adjudicator will find that duress exists—indeed, the strict  
five-factor standard set by Negusie264 will be hard for many people to meet. 
In so many of the criminal and international cases concerning duress,  
the courts apply a test (whether the five-factor one, or something less 
strict)—and find the person has not met the standard. However, treating 
duress as an exception makes more conceptual sense as a normative 
matter, since someone who can meet the standard should not be defined 
first as a terrorist and then have that finding waived—they should not be 
defined as a terrorist in the first instance. 
Likewise, in asylum law, the concept of duress logically fits earlier, 
in the threshold inquiry for deciding if someone has committed a serious 
nonpolitical crime: the question of atrociousness of the asylum-seeker’s 
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conduct.265 Conduct committed under duress is understood throughout all 
the law discussed in Part I as making an individual less culpable than 
conduct committed without duress, and culpability matters to a finding of 
atrociousness.266 Contemplating duress at this initial stage might result in 
a finding that conduct was not “atrocious”; this would mean there is no bar 
to asylum at all, not that there is a bar that needs to be examined for the 
existence of, perhaps, an exception. 
Setting a uniform test for duress and making duress as an initial legal 
inquiry are steps forward. However, clarifying the role of UNHRC 
guidance in the course will ensure consistency between U.S. immigration 
law and international immigration guidance. 
3. Clarifying the Role of UNHCR Guidance 
Because no law can anticipate all applications and future legal 
questions, the ideal inclusion, in the law and not just (as at present) the 
legislative history, would be a statement to the effect that guidance issued 
by the UNHCR is presumed to be followed, unless there is a specific and 
compelling reason to adopt a different interpretation. Such a standard 
would respect the specialized expertise that UNHCR has in both 
understanding the Convention’s provisions and history and monitoring 
and guiding the development of interpretive caselaw worldwide. 
B. Judges Can Do This 
Ana’s story is one the judges have the ability to examine, understand, 
and analyze, despite the anxiety that the Fedorenko Court267 expressed 
about the challenges of line-drawing. While agreeing that duress begets 
complicated decisions, the kinds of findings that the major tests require 
are well within the capacities of the existing immigration court system, 
and the alternative—the wrongful exclusion of people whose claims 
should be found to merit protection—is too steep a cost to washing judicial 
hands of the issue. 
The elements of the five-part test for duress are actually quite 
familiar to immigration adjudicators. Consider the question of “imminent” 
threats of “death or serious bodily injury.” This is very close to the analysis 
asylum officers and immigration judges routinely make concerning the 
existence of persecution, which has a richly developed caselaw focused on 
“deprivations of life and liberty.”268 Indeed, the standard is even more 
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complex in asylum adjudication, because the factfinder must examine the 
motive before finding persecution exists. These factfinders must also 
ascertain, often from the surrounding context of an applicant’s claim, how 
real the threats of persecution are, whether the threatened conduct counts 
as persecution269 and so forth. In Ana’s story, a judge could inquire into 
why Ana thought the harm was likely to occur, and evidence of past abuse 
would be helpful to that inquiry. 
Likewise, another element of the definition is establishing that the 
threat is “well-grounded,” meaning the fear is reasonable.270 This is 
strikingly close to the core concept of a “well-founded fear” in 
immigration law, basic to all asylum claims. The definition elucidated 
through case law, just as with duress caselaw, focuses on the 
reasonableness of the fear. The foundational case Matter of Mogharrabi 
requires an applicant to show that a “reasonable person in his 
circumstances would fear persecution.”271 In other words, such findings 
are what immigration adjudicators do. In Ana’s case, the judge would 
consider the plausibility of her account—do the kinds of abuse she 
experienced happen in her country? With how much impunity? What 
evidence concerning country conditions supports such a contention? All 
of this is exactly what judges must already do in the asylum context. 
Judges’ adjudicatory discretion remains profoundly important to this 
issue.272 As noted above, the existence of the duress exception does not 
mean that judges will find it exists in every case. A judge could find that 
Ana did not undertake a reasonable opportunity to escape, or that the threat 
was not imminent, and so forth. Judges retain significant interpretive 
discretion, even in immigration law where discretion has narrowed 
significantly over recent decades.273 To the extent there are concerns that 
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a duress exception will lead to errors, admitting people who are culpable 
for offenses barred by the immigration law, adjudicators have the skill and 
ability to serve as effective gatekeepers. 
CONCLUSION 
Immigration law has no coherent understanding of when and how the 
duress doctrine applies. This state of the law leads to the same conduct 
receiving wildly different treatment, which is not the hallmark of sound 
jurisprudence. It also marks immigration law as an outlier, as other bodies 
of law have developed robust interpretations of duress. The gaps are most 
urgent in asylum law, which is—bewilderingly, given its protective 
function—presently the least amenable to understanding how an  
asylum-seeker’s conduct might be excused or mitigated by the existence 
of duress. But this article has shown that even in its other applications, 
immigration law’s treatment of duress is highly inconsistent. 
Duress is a doctrine that has been developed equally in common law 
jurisprudence, and in statutes and civil codes. If Congress does not act, 
then judges are highly capable of administering an effective standard, as 
shown by the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision in the remanded 
Matter of Negusie.274 However, a judicial approach suffers from the 
special instability of immigration law in an era where Attorneys General 
are aggressively using their powers of referral to undo the careful decisions 
of their own administrative law judges. Those powers have been and will 
continue to be critiqued, and perhaps the decisions flowing from these 
political actions will be vulnerable if circuit courts decline—rightly, in this 
article’s view—to extend deference to them under Chevron. 
Until such time as the Attorney General power to undo immigration 
common law is curtailed, however, a codification of the duress doctrine in 
the immigration statute is gravely needed so that duress will be understood 
in affecting whether particular bars and grounds of inadmissibility exist at 
all—not whether those bars and grounds should be waived as a matter of 
discretion. Congress must amend the nation’s immigration law to resolve 
the absurd and contradictory results that flow from the current 
disharmonies. Ana’s culpability for wrongdoing should be understood in 
the context of duress, and U.S. immigration law should not hold her 
coerced conduct against her. The might principle of the duress defense, 
embraced throughout criminal and international law, must be enshrined in 
the nation’s immigration law as well. 
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